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The Research Committee of the Banco de España is pleased to announce the Spring 2017 issue of our Research 
Update. The Update aims to inform both academic and policy-oriented economists and financial specialists 
about publications, conferences, and other research activities at the Banco de España.
This issue includes five feature articles summarizing notable recent Banco de España projects in diverse areas of 
research. First, an article by Galo Nuño and Carlos Thomas outlines a new methodology for solving optimal policy 
problems in dynamic models with heterogeneous agents, and applies it to an example that studies the redistributive 
effects of monetary policy. The remaining features are empirical, documenting how the efficiency of the judicial 
system affects economic outcomes in Spain (Mora-Sanguinetti), which factors explain governments’ failure to 
follow fiscal rules (Delgado, Lledó, and Pérez), how the effects of recent unconventional monetary policies differed 
across European countries (Burriel and Galesi), and to what extent work experience is a substitute for formal 
education in helping workers accumulate skills (Jimeno, Lacuesta, Martínez-Matute, and Villanueva). In addition, 
this Research Update interviews Carlos Thomas, who was recently appointed to head the Monetary Policy Unit, 
regarding his work on labor markets, monetary policy, and banking.
This year the Banco de España will host an unusual number of conferences, reflecting several new and continuing 
initiatives. Starting in 2017, it will regularly organize two conferences featuring top academics from around the 
world: an Annual Research Conference, and a biennial Conference on Financial Stability. This year it will also host 
two workshops for the newly-established Research Clusters of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB). It 
will also collaborate on conferences with other academic and policy institutions such as the CEPR, the ADEMU 
network, and the World Bank.
We highlight these and other research developments at the Banco de España in hopes that they will interest the 
broader research community, in Spain and internationally, and thereby contribute to an improved understanding 
of economic policy.
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FEATURES
OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY WITH HETEROGENEOUS AGENTS
GALO NUÑO AND CARLOS THOMAS
WORKING PAPER Nº 1624
Economic models with heterogeneous agents are 
increasingly used for policy analysis. We propose a novel 
methodology for solving dynamic optimal policy problems 
in models of this kind, both under discretion and 
commitment. We illustrate our methodology by studying 
optimal monetary policy in an incomplete-markets model. 
Under discretion, an inflationary bias arises from the central 
bank’s attempt to redistribute wealth towards debtor 
households, which have higher marginal utility of net 
wealth. Under commitment, this inflationary force is 
counteracted over time by the incentive to prevent 
expectations of future inflation from being priced into new 
bond issuances; under certain conditions, long run inflation 
is zero as these two effects cancel out asymptotically. 
Introduction
A recent literature addresses the importance of 
household heterogeneity in the transmission of 
monetary policy.1 These Heterogeneous Agent New 
Keynesian (HANK) models are providing new insights 
about how relevant the redistributions associated with 
monetary policy are for understanding business cycle 
dynamics. A major shortcoming of this literature is that 
it provides few policy prescriptions, as the optimal 
monetary policy can only be studied under very 
restrictive assumptions. The difficulty of analyzing the 
optimal monetary policy arises from the fact that in 
these models the state of the economy is described by 
the income-wealth distribution, a very high-dimensional 
object, making the traditional approaches to the 
optimal policy problem too complex.
In a recent working paper, Nuño and Thomas (2016), 
we propose a novel methodology for solving fully 
dynamic optimal policy problems in models with 
heterogeneous agents, both under discretion and 
commitment, in the absence of aggregate shocks. To 
this end we use recent continuous-time mathematical 
techniques related to what is now known as “mean 
field game theory”.2
Model
We illustrate our methods by analyzing optimal 
monetary policy in an incomplete-markets economy. 
Our framework is close to Huggett’s (1993) model: 
households trade non-contingent claims, subject to an 
exogenous borrowing limit, to smooth consumption in 
the face of idiosyncratic income shocks. We depart 
from Huggett’s framework by considering nominally 
non-contingent bonds with an arbitrarily long maturity. 
This allows monetary policy to have an effect on 
equilibrium allocations. In particular, as in Fisher 
(1933), unanticipated inflation redistributes wealth 
from lenders to borrowers.3 In order to have a 
meaningful trade-off in the choice of the inflation path, 
we also assume that inflation is costly. In addition, 
expected future inflation raises the nominal cost of 
new debt issuances through inflation premia. Also, we 
consider a small open economy, which may sell some 
of its (domestic currency-denominated) bonds to risk-
neutral foreign investors. As a result, the redistributive 
channel operates not only between domestic lenders 
and borrowers, but also between the latter and foreign 
bond holders.
1  See, for instance, Auclert (2016), Doepke and Schneider 
(2006b), Kaplan, Moll and Violante (2016), Gornemann, 
Kuester and Nakajima (2012), McKay, Nakamura and 
Steinsson (2015), Luetticke (2015), Meh, Ríos-Rull and 
Terajima (2010), Sheedy (2014), Challe et al. (2015) or Sterk 
and Tenreyro (2015).
2  See Lasry and Lions (2006) or Nuño and Moll (2016).
3  See Doepke and Schneider (2006a) for a study of net 
nominal asset positions across US household groups which 
estimates the potential for inflation-led redistribution. See 
Auclert (2016) for a recent analysis of the Fisherian channel 
in a more general model that allows for additional 
redistributive mechanisms.
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assets drift away from their current level a,  s i  f i 
represents a flow of mass away from the neighborhood 
of the point (a, y i  ). But (when s i > 0 ), this is offset by a 
flow into the neighborhood of (a, y i ) from a lower asset 
level a-da. Therefore, if s i f i is unchanging with a, the 
mass around (a, y i ) is neither increased nor decreased 
by savings. But if  ∂ 
∂a
 (s i f i ) > 0, then savings behavior 
causes the mass around (a, y i ) to decrease over time 
(the flow away from (a, y i ) exceeds the flow into that 
neighborhood).
Methodology
We assume that the central bank is utilitarian, i.e. it 
gives the same Pareto weight to each household. Thus, 
it maximizes the following welfare criterion:
U CB = ∫ϕ 
∞
 ∑ v i (0,a) f i (0, a) da.
We now consider both the case in which the central 
bank can credibly commit to a future inflation path (the 
Ramsey problem), and the time-consistent case in 
which the central bank decides optimal current inflation 
given the current state of the economy (the Markov 
Perfect equilibrium). 
Discretion. In the case of discretion, the central bank 
cannot commit to any future policy. The inflation rate π 
then depends only on the current aggregate state 
variable, the net wealth distribution: π (t) ≡ π [  f (t, a,y)]. 
Notice that the inflation policy is not an ordinary 
function, but a functional, as it maps the infinite-
dimensional state variable f (t, a, y) into ℝ. The 
appropriate solution concept is a Markov Perfect 
Equilibrium (MPE) in a space of distributions. The 
central bank maximizes aggregate welfare subject to 
the law of motion of the distribution, taking bond prices 
and individual consumption policies as given. We frame 
this decision as a dynamic programming problem on a 
suitable space of functions, and solve it using variational 
arguments. In particular, we employ Gateaux derivatives, 
which generalize the concept of derivatives to functional 
spaces.
In the case of separable preferences u (c,π ) = u c (c) - u π (π), 
the inflation under discretion satisfies:
u π 
π 
= ∫ϕ 
∞
 ∑ (-a) u c c f i (t,a) da.
That is, at all times, optimal discretionary inflation 
increases with the average cross-household net liability 
position weighted by each household’s marginal utility 
We now describe of the main model elements.
Individual states. Over a brief interval dt, a household´s 
real wealth a evolves as da t = s t dt , where 
st = ( rt - πt ) at +  
yt - c  t
is the drift, π is inflation, y is an exogenous output 
endowment (assumed to follow a 2-state Markov 
chain with transition probabilities λ 1 and λ 2 ), c is 
consumption, Q is the nominal bond price, and 
r = δ / Q - δ is the nominal bond yield, where δ is the 
amortization rate. Domestic bonds are in positive net 
supply, and are priced by risk-neutral foreign 
investors.
Household problem. The value function of a household 
is defined by
v ( t, a, y ) = max { c s } s = t ∞  E t ∫ t  
∞
 e -ρ(s-t) u (c s ,π s )ds,
subject to the law of motion of a. Notice that 
instantaneous utility depends both on consumption 
and inflation.4 The dynamic programming or Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation for this problem is 
ρv i = 
∂vi  + max c { u ( c, π ) + s i ∂v i }+λ i [ v j - v i ],
for i ≠ j = 1,2, where v i ( t, a ) = v ( t, a, y i ). This HJB 
equation closely resembles the analogous discrete-
time Bellman equation for a household that chooses 
between consumption and saving while facing 
Markovian income shocks.  
Wealth distribution. The law of motion of the household 
wealth distribution f i (t, a) = f (t, a, y i ) is given by the so-
called Kolmogorov forward (KF) equation,
∂f i  = -  
∂   (s i f i ) -λ i f i + λ j f j ,
which describes how the density of households f varies 
over time at all points (a, y i ). The last two terms in this 
equation show the loss of mass around a given point 
(a, y i ) as some households’ income changes from y i to 
y j , offset by the gain in mass around (a, y i ) as others’ 
income changes from y j to y i . 
The first term in the KF equation deserves more 
explanation. Since si is the rate at which a household’s 
4  This can be micro-founded by assuming firms face sticky 
prices à la Rotemberg (1982).
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by an opposing force: the central bank internalizes how 
investors’ expectations of future inflation affect their 
pricing of the long-term nominal bonds from the time the 
optimal commitment plan is formulated (“time zero”) 
onwards. At time zero, inflation is close to that under 
discretion, as no prior commitments exist. But from then 
on, the fact that the price of newly issued bonds 
incorporates promises about the future inflation path 
gives the central bank an incentive to commit to reducing 
inflation over time. Importantly, we show that under 
certain conditions on preferences the steady state 
inflation rate under the optimal commitment is zero; that 
is, in the long run the redistributive motive to inflate 
exactly cancels out with the incentive to reduce inflation 
expectations and nominal yields for an economy that is 
a net debtor.
Numerical analysis
We then solve numerically for the full transition path 
under commitment and discretion. We calibrate our 
model to match a number of features of a prototypical 
European small open economy, such as the size of gross 
household debt and their net international position.
We find that optimal time-zero inflation, which as 
mentioned before is very similar under commitment 
and discretion, is quite high. We also show that both 
the cross-border and the domestic redistributive 
motives are quantitatively relevant for initial inflation. 
Under discretion, inflation remains high due to the 
inflationary bias discussed before (see the figure). 
Under commitment, by contrast, inflation falls gradually 
towards its long-run level (essentially zero, under our 
calibration), reflecting the central bank”s efforts to 
prevent expectations of future inflation from being 
priced into new bond issuances. In summary, under 
commitment the central bank front-loads inflation so as 
to transitorily redistribute existing wealth from lenders 
to borrowing households, but commits to gradually 
undo such initial inflation.
In welfare terms, the discretionary policy implies sizable 
losses relative to the optimal commitment. These 
losses are suffered by creditor households, but also by 
debtor ones. The reason is that, under discretion, 
expectations of permanent future positive inflation are 
fully priced into current nominal yields. This impairs the 
very redistributive effects of inflation that the central 
bank is trying to bring about, and leaves only the direct 
welfare costs of permanent inflation, which are borne 
by creditor and debtor households alike. 
of net wealth. This reflects an “inflation bias”, whereby 
the central bank tries to use inflation so as to redistribute 
wealth, and hence consumption, in two ways. On one 
hand, inflation redistributes from foreign investors to 
domestic borrowers (cross-border redistribution). On 
the other hand, and somewhat more subtly, under 
market incompleteness and standard concave 
preferences for consumption, borrowing households 
have a higher marginal utility of net wealth than lenders. 
Hence, they receive a higher effective weight in the 
optimal inflation decision, giving the central bank an 
incentive to redistribute wealth from creditors to 
debtors (domestic redistribution).
Commitment. Assume now that the central bank can 
credibly commit at time zero to the complete future 
inflation path. The optimal inflation path is thus a 
function of the initial distribution f0 (a) and of time: 
π (t) ≡ π [ t, f0 (a)]. Under commitment, the central bank 
maximizes welfare taking into account not only the 
dynamics of wealth (the KF equation), but also the HJB 
equation and the bond pricing condition. That is, the 
central bank understands how it can steer households’ 
and foreign investors’ expectations by committing to 
an inflation path, unlike the discretionary case, where 
the central bank takes expectations as given. The 
appropriate solution concept under commitment is that 
of a Ramsey problem. Here, the Ramsey problem is an 
optimal control problem in a function space; calculating 
the first-order conditions again requires Gateaux 
derivatives. 
For separable preferences, the optimal inflation under 
commitment satisfies
u π 
π 
=∫ϕ 
∞
 ∑ (-a) u c c  f i (t,a) da + μ (t) Q(t),
where the costate μ(t) captures the value to the central 
bank of promises about time t inflation made to foreign 
investors at time 0. The value is zero at the time the 
Ramsey plan is announced (t = 0), when the central 
bank is not bound by previous commitments, but it will 
generally be different from zero at any time t > 0. By 
contrast, in the MPE case no promises are made at any 
time, hence the absence of this costate. Therefore, the 
static trade-off between the welfare cost of inflation 
and the welfare gains from inflating away net liabilities, 
explained above in the MPE context, is now modified 
by the central bank’s need to respect past promises to 
investors about current inflation. 
Under commitment, the same redistributive motives to 
inflate exist as under discretion, but they are counteracted 
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ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
ON THE EFFICIENCY OF THE SPANISH ECONOMY
JUAN S. MORA-SANGUINETTI
Introduction
The economic literature has stressed the critical role 
played by institutions to explain differences in economic 
performance across nations [Hall and Jones (1999) and 
Helpman (2008)]. North (1990) concludes that less 
effective enforcement mechanisms (rather than 
regulation per se) were the key institutional difference 
between the Third World and developed countries. He 
argued that both contracting, and verifying compliance 
with contracts, is crucial for economic efficiency [Coase 
(1960), North (1990)]. Similarly, regarding the law, if 
enforcement institutions fail to function efficiently, or 
operate in an extortionate fashion, legal uncertainty 
may inhibit transactions. Indeed, there is ample 
empirical evidence that protection of property rights 
and private contracts promotes economic development 
(Acemoglu et al., 2001, Rodrik et al., 2004, Acemoglu 
and Johnson, 2005). 
Likewise, many studies have shown how the efficiency 
of judicial systems affects specific aspects of economic 
performance for very different countries (Palumbo et 
al., 2013). For instance, Djankov et al. (2008), Bae and 
Goyal (2009), Qian and Strahan (2007), Jappelli et al. 
(2005) and Shvets (2013) have addressed the impact of 
justice on the development of credit markets. Due in 
part to their effect on credit markets, firm size, firm 
growth, and even firm specialization also appear to be 
positively related to the efficiency of judicial systems 
[Laeven and Woodruff (2007), Giacomelli and Menon 
(2016)]. In addition, the literature highlights that judicial 
performance also affects the use of resources and 
technology (Ferguson and Formai, 2013), the structure 
of housing markets (Casas-Arce and Saiz, 2010), and 
the functioning of labour market relationships (Berger 
and Neugart, 2011, Ichino et al., 2003). 
The quality of enforcement institutions in Spain
The efficiency of the judicial system is also an important 
issue for the Spanish economy. Compared with other 
high-income countries, the Spanish judicial system 
shows a relatively low level of efficacy. Evidence for this 
can be found either by looking directly at data sources 
on the performance of judicial systems such as those 
of the OECD (Palumbo et al., 2013) or the CEPEJ 
(2014), or by analyzing estimates based on survey data 
(World Bank, 2015). 
Moreover, the performance of the system has not 
shown improvements since the beginning of the 2000s, 
in contrast to recent advances in other areas of the 
Spanish economy and society. More specifically, the 
efficiency of the system worsened during the economic 
expansion, then improved in the recession (returning to 
initial values), largely due to a reduction in the demand 
for litigation (Mora-Sanguinetti, 2016). 
Finally, there is substantial regional diversity in the 
efficacy of the judicial system. This raises the question 
of potential different impacts on economic efficiency in 
Spain at a disaggregated level. Figure 1 illustrates the 
geographical variation of the clearance rate (as a proxy 
of judicial efficacy) for a standard civil procedure for the 
period of expansion between 2001 and 2007, and since 
2008, for the Spanish recession. From the data, we 
could expect that the impacts of justice on economic 
efficiency will vary according to the province or region. 
Indeed, these impacts can be measured, as Spain is 
one of the few countries that has quality databases to 
properly study how enforcement institutions affect the 
economy at a disaggregated level.
Judicial efficiency and economic outcomes in Spain
Several recently published studies by Banco de España 
economists analyze the impacts of local differences in 
judicial efficacy on diverse aspects of the Spanish 
economy, including the average size of companies, 
firm entry and exit rates, entrepreneurship rates, credit 
availability, distortions in rental and home ownership 
shares in the real estate market, and the behavior of 
Spanish local labour markets.
García-Posada and Mora-Sanguinetti (2015) found that 
greater efficacy of the judicial system at the local level 
increases the growth and size of Spanish companies 
and also favors entry of new firms. They found no 
significant effect on the exit rate, however. The implied 
effects on firm size and growth are economically 
significant. If the province with the lowest judicial 
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efficacy (when solving a declaratory trial) improved to 
align with the best practice, the relative increase in the 
average firm size would range from 0.6 to 2.8% while 
annual firm growth would rise between 1.1 and 2.8 
percentage points. Attributing to the province with the 
worst judicial efficacy the best law enforcement in the 
sample, the relative increase in its entry rate would 
range between 8.8 and 9.5%1. 
If we analyze the firm entry rate by type (that is, if we 
differentiate across legal company types, such as 
limited liability –sociedades anónimas and limitadas-, 
unlimited liability, and entrepreneurs), a decrease in the 
efficacy of justice (when solving a declaratory 
procedure) is only found to reduce the entry of new 
entrepreneurs, without a significant impact on larger 
firms with limited liability structures (García-Posada 
and Mora-Sanguinetti, 2014). If the province with the 
lowest judicial efficacy improved to match the efficacy 
of the least congested one, the increase in the rate of 
entry of entrepreneurs would be between 5 and 7%. 
This result is consistent with the idea that the lack of 
judicial efficacy can be considered a fixed cost to be 
paid by the companies that litigate and, like any fixed 
cost, is a proportionally larger burden for a (small) 
entrepreneur than for a large company.
The previous examples refer to the impacts of judicial 
efficacy in “declaratory” procedures. The “declaratory” 
stage refers to the time at which the existence of a debt 
or an obligation is declared and acknowledged by a 
judge. If the debtor decides, after all, not to fulfill the 
obligation declared by the judge (for instance, choosing 
not to repay a loan even after the judgment), a second 
procedure, an “execution”, may take place. In the 
execution stage, the civil judge forcibly compels the 
debtor to pay (for example, the judge may take the money 
from the bank accounts of the debtor). Thus, “execution” 
is not always needed and therefore the importance of the 
different procedures varies between different studies. 
Judicial performance also has some specific impacts 
on real estate markets (Mora-Sanguinetti, 2012). 
Indeed, legal certainty seems relevant for the 
relationship between the rental and the property 
market, affecting the prevalence of each type of tenure. 
If a landlord perceives insecurity in expelling a tenant 
who does not pay the rent or does not comply with the 
conditions of the lease, he or she may decide to remove 
the dwelling from the rental market, increasing the 
share of property in the local economy. More specifically, 
an increase in judicial efficacy at the execution stage (in 
which an expulsion –lanzamiento- of the delinquent 
tenant takes place) is estimated to have a positive 
impact on the rental market (a reduction in one point of 
judicial congestion 2 would increase the tenancy rate by 
0.15 percentage points). In other words, taking Madrid 
as an example, the estimates suggest that a 1 point 
decrease in the rate of judicial congestion would attract 
1  These ranges refer to the results of the different econometric 
specifications studied.
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JUDICAL CLEARANCE RATES FOR ORDINARY CIVIL TRIALS, BY PROVINCE
SOURCE: Own elaboration using CGPJ data.
FIGURE 1
PANEL A: 2001-2007 PANEL B: 2008-2012
2  The judicial congestion rate (which is the inverse of the 
clearance rate mentioned above) is the number of cases 
pending resolution plus the new cases entering the judicial 
system at a given point in time, divided by the number of 
cases that the system is able to resolve at that time. The 
higher the congestion rate, the lower the efficacy of the 
judicial system.
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In addition to these analyses of judicial enforcement of 
private contracts (which are resolved in the civil 
jurisdiction), there is also research on the role of the 
Spanish court system in resolving conflicts in labour 
markets (dismissals specifically). Jimeno et al. (2015) 
point out that judges are “active” decision makers 
when interpreting the Law in a dismissal conflict in 
Spain, and therefore their behavior affects the ratio 
between legal and de facto dismissal costs (i.e. the 
compensation actually paid in Spain to the dismissed 
employee). The results indicate that judges seem to be 
sensitive to local market conditions (such as the 
unemployment rate) and not only to legal provisions. 
The labor market reforms of 2010 and 2012 have 
slightly reduced the association between the 
unemployment rate and the likelihood that a dismissal 
is declared inadmissible by a judge.
Finally, as used here, the “efficacy” of the judicial 
system means its ability to complete decisions on 
cases brought before the courts. But it is also relevant 
to study how the number of court cases is determined. 
Mora-Sanguinetti and Garoupa (2015) analysed, using 
instrumental variables, whether the number of lawyers 
in the market in Spain (which displays substantial 
geographical variation, as shown in Figure 2) was 
related to the amount of litigation, over the period 
2001–2010. Their results showed that the number of 
lawyers had a positive effect on litigation. More 
specifically, a one percent increase in the number of 
lawyers per capita entailed an increase in litigation of 
around 1.4%.
Table 2 summarises the results found in some of the 
studies discussed above.
about 3400 dwellings to the rental market; in Barcelona, 
the estimated increase would be 3100 homes; and in 
Valencia, 1400.
Judicial performance also affects the size of credit 
markets. In a recent study, Mora-Sanguinetti et al. 
(2016, forthcoming 2017) analyze how local differences 
in the availability of credit and the evolution of non-
performing loans (NPL) ratios may be partially explained 
by regional variations in the quality of loan contract 
enforcement. This analysis is performed both for 
periods of sustained growth (2001-2007) and recession 
(since 2008) in the Spanish economy. The research 
concludes that a rise in the clearance rate of executions 
increases the ratio of total credit to GDP at the local 
level. However, the declaratory stage of the procedure 
does not seem to be statistically significant. 
A possible explanation for this finding is that, throughout 
the economic cycle, a relevant proportion of the 
defaults that take place are strategic (i.e., defaults by a 
solvent debtor). Furthermore, it is observed that, in 
provinces where declaratory procedures are more 
efficient, less credit is declared as non-performing. The 
latter effect, however, is only observed after the onset 
of the “Great Recession” in 2008. A plausible 
explanation is that non-strategic defaults (i.e., defaults 
caused by the debtor’s inability to honor his debts) are 
much more frequent during recessions than strategic 
defaults, because borrowers’ cash flows and collateral 
values are very low. In that case, what matters is the 
judicial efficacy at the declaration stage, as debtors do 
not voluntarily default on their obligations, making the 
execution stage less relevant. A summary of all these 
results can be found in Table 1. 
                                        
Expansion Recession Expansion Recession
Declaratory No significant effect No significant effect No significant effect Decrease
tceffe tnacifingis oNtceffe tnacifingis oNesaercnIesaercnInoitucexE
soitar LPNytilibaliava tiderC
TABLE 1
SOURCE: Mora-Sanguinetti et al. (2016, forthcoming 2017).
IMPACTS OF THE PERFORMANCE OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM ON CREDIT MARKET DEVELOPMENT
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SourceEstimated effectProcedureExperimentOutcome
Housing rentals           
congestion rate 
Execution
by 0.15 percentage points
Mora-Sanguinetti (2012)
Entrepreneurship practice
entrepreneurs between 5 and 7%. 
Garcia-Posada and Mora-
Sanguinetti (2014)
Firm size Align with the best judicial 
practice
practice
Declaration Increase in the average  
firm size would range from 
0.6 to 2.8%
Garcia-Posada and Mora-
Sanguinetti (2015)
Firm growth Align with the best judicial 
practice
Declaration Annual firm growth would rise 
between 1.1 and 2.8 percentage 
points
Garcia-Posada and Mora-
Sanguinetti (2015)
Firm entry Align with the best judicial 
practice
Declaration Increase in entry rate 
would range between 8.8 
and 9.5%.
Garcia-Posada and Mora-
Sanguinetti (2015)
Litigiousness Increase of 1% in the number  
of lawyers per capita
NA Litigation would Increase 
by 1.4%
Mora-Sanguinetti and 
Garoupa (2015)
Credit availability Increase of 1% in the judicial 
clearance rate 
Execution Increase by 0.32% the ratio 
of total credit to GDP 
Mora-Sanguinetti et al. 
(2017)
SUMMARY OF RECENT FINDINGS TABLE 2
SOURCE: Author’s elaboration. The estimated effect ranges refer to the results of the different econometric specifications studied.
1 point reduction in the judicial 
Align with the best judicial Increase in the rate of entry of Declaration
Increase in the tenancy rate 
LESS THAN 1.59 1.59 - 1.90 1.90 - 2.34 MORE THAN 2.34
NUMBER OF LAWYERS PER THOUSAND INHABITANTS, BY PROVINCE (AVERAGE 2000-2015)
SOURCE: Author’s elaboration, using data from the census of the Consejo General de la Abogacía Española (2016).
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of the euro area. In this paper we tackle these issues by 
estimating a global vector autoregressive model 
(GVAR), a multi-country model which exploits panel 
variation across all current members of the monetary 
union. Two features of this framework are particularly 
attractive. First, being a multi-country model, the GVAR 
deals with country heterogeneity and allows for an 
assessment of asymmetries in the transmission of 
UMP measures. And second, the model allows 
monetary policy to affect a given economy not just 
directly, but also indirectly via cross-country 
interactions. By taking into account spillovers across 
members of the euro area, the GVAR allows for a more 
precise identification of the impact of UMP shocks.
Methodology 
We explicitly model each member economy of the euro 
area in the spirit of the mixed cross section GVAR 
developed in Georgiadis (2015). The model consists of 
two blocks: a system of 19 national VAR models in 
which cross-country interactions are explicitly modeled; 
and a VAR model for common factors which affect all 
euro area countries, for instance the ECB’s monetary 
policy. Figure 1 depicts a stylized graph of the structure 
of the model. Monetary policy shocks affect a given 
economy not just directly, but also indirectly via cross-
country interactions. Moreover, the common monetary 
policy depends on economic developments at the euro 
area level, hence the model accounts for the 
endogenous two-way feedback loops between 
countries and the common monetary policy of the ECB.
Specifically, each national economy consists of a VAR 
model which includes three sets of variables: (i) national 
variables, which represent the domestic macroeconomic 
and financial conditions of the economy, namely GDP, 
consumer prices, real exchange rate, a measure of 
credit risk (developed in Gilchrist and Mojon, 2014) and 
new lending, as well as a measure of asset prices; (ii) 
foreign-specific variables, which represent the influence 
of the main economic partners of a given economy and 
capture the relative spillovers, and are calculated as 
weighted averages of the corresponding domestic 
variables of other countries, with weights based on 
bilateral trade flows; (iii) common variables, such as 
monetary policy indicators, which affect all countries 
simultaneously. 
UNCOVERING THE HETEROGENEOUS EFFECTS OF ECB 
UNCONVENTIONAL MONETARY POLICIES ACROSS EURO AREA 
COUNTRIES
PABLO BURRIEL AND ALESSANDRO GALESI 
WORKING PAPER Nº 1631
We assess the effects of recent ECB unconventional 
monetary policy measures by estimating a global VAR 
that exploits panel variation across euro area economies 
and allows for cross-country interdependencies. 
Unconventional monetary policy measures have 
beneficial effects on activity, credit, inflation, and equity 
prices, and lead to a depreciation of the exchange rate. 
Most euro area members benefit from these measures, 
but with a substantial degree of heterogeneity. Cross-
country spillovers account for a sizable fraction of this 
dispersion, and substantially amplify effects. Countries 
with less fragile banking systems benefit the most from 
unconventional monetary policy measures. Compared 
to a conventional monetary expansion, unconventional 
measures are particularly effective in reducing firms’ 
financing costs and boosting credit.
The events since the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 
September 2008 led central banks around the world to 
employ unconventional monetary policy (UMP) 
measures to fulfill their mandate of price stability. In the 
case of the ECB, the monetary policy response to the 
crisis has been shaped by the particularly large degree 
of heterogeneity across euro area member states, and 
spillovers between those states. In this vein, ECB 
President Mario Draghi stated:
“We faced severe impairments to the transmission 
of monetary policy across the euro area, with 
marked heterogeneity from country to country. This 
called for unconventional measures tailored to the 
specific frictions at hand.” Draghi (2014)
“Today’s economic and monetary union is larger 
and more diverse than a single country, such as 
Germany. It is highly integrated but still at times 
fragmented. And it comprises a very large number 
of policy-makers on fiscal, structural and other 
economic matters. All policy-makers have to 
recognise that we belong to EMU together and that 
policies as well as policy inaction create spillovers 
for other members. This is an enormous 
responsibility for governments and other economic 
policymakers.” Draghi (2013)
These remarks suggest that assessing the effectiveness 
of recent ECB UMP measures requires dealing with 
heterogeneity and interdependence across members 
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the face of stress situations. This is especially relevant 
in a setting in which the monetary authority has kept to 
its liquidity-providing policy with full allotment of the 
demand for liquidity. The second condition identifies 
measures that actually increase the level of banks’ 
excess reserves, which should bring very short-term 
money market rates (Eonia) closer to the ECB’s deposit 
facility rate1.
For comparison purposes, standard conventional 
monetary policy shocks are also identified, by requiring 
that lowering the official policy rate increases output 
and inflation of the euro area. At the same time, changes 
in the policy rate are required not to move the ECB’s 
balance sheet, so as to disentangle conventional 
policies from UMP shocks.
Results
We estimate the model using monthly data over the 
period January 2007 - September 2015, and we 
examine the effects of UMP shocks both for the whole 
euro area and for all member countries individually. 
From the euro area perspective, exogenous UMP 
shocks have beneficial effects on activity, credit, 
inflation, and equity prices, and lead to a depreciation 
of the exchange rate. 
At the disaggregated level, most euro area members 
benefit from these measures: the UMP shock leads to 
significant increases in output growth and inflation in 
most of the countries, with effects that on average fade 
out after roughly six months. However, the effects are 
substantially heterogeneous across countries. Figure 2 
The VAR model of the common factors includes five 
aggregate euro area indicators: growth in Eurosystem 
balance sheet assets, the interest rate on the main 
refinancing operations, the spread between that rate 
and the overnight interest rate (Eonia), a financial stress 
indicator (the CISS index of Holló et al. 2012), and long-
term inflation expectations. In addition, the model 
includes a set of feedback variables that capture the 
effects of macroeconomic developments at the euro 
area level on the common factors, constructed as 
weighted averages of all countries’ domestic variables, 
with weights are based on GDP shares.
Estimating the macroeconomic effects of the ECB’s 
unconventional monetary policies is a complex 
exercise. There is no precedent for the extent to which 
central banks have used non-standard instruments 
since the onset of the financial crisis in 2007, which 
means that the empirical analysis must be concentrated 
on a relatively short period. An added difficulty is the 
wide range of non-standard measures that the ECB 
has used in the various phases of the crisis. We use a 
combination of sign restrictions and zero restrictions 
on the impulse responses to identify UMP shocks.
In line with the most recent literature, the model uses 
the change in the Eurosystem balance sheet as a 
variable to capture the interventions of the monetary 
authority. Concretely, following the approach of Boeckx 
et al. (2017), non-standard monetary policy decisions 
are identified by two restrictions. First, they should 
represent exogenous balance sheet expansions: that 
is, expansions that are not responses to heightened 
financial stress. Second, they should reduce the spread 
between short-term interbank rates and the interest 
rate on the main refinancing operations. The first 
condition excludes changes in the ECB’s balance sheet 
that arise from banking system liquidity requirements in 
STRUCTURE OF THE GVAR FIGURE 1
SYSTEM OF 19 INTER-LINKED NATIONAL VARs VAR MODEL FOR COMMON FACTORS
Spanish
GDP & HICP
euro area GDP & HICP
Italian
GDP & HICP
French
GDP & HICP
ECB balance sheet
MRO rate
EONIA-MRO spread
CISS index
German
GDP & HICP
1  See results and related discussion in Banco de España (2015).
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We then turn to investigate which structural features of 
the economy may be good predictors of this 
heterogeneity in effects. To this end, we regress the 
estimated effects over a set of country-specific 
variables: real GDP per capita, as a proxy for the level 
of economic development of a country; an index of 
soundness of the banking sector, which is proxied by 
the share of capital in total assets held by banks; the 
unemployment rate, as a proxy for various factors such 
as aggregate demand conditions and labor market 
frictions; and an index of ease of doing business 
developed by the World Bank, to account for all those 
frictions and barriers which may impede the creation of 
new firms.
A preliminary inspection of the data shows that there is 
substantial correlation between the effects of UMP 
shocks and the soundness of each national banking 
system. Figure 4 plots for each country the peak 
responses of inflation and output growth against its 
banks’ capital ratio. Countries with less fragile banking 
systems benefit the most from unconventional 
monetary policy measures, and this correlation holds 
when controlling for alternative country-specific 
characteristics in the regressions. This result suggests 
the existence of a potential bottleneck in the 
effectiveness of unconventional monetary policies 
which works via the bank lending channel, as already 
shown in Boeckx et al. (2017). Indeed, expansionary 
policies should benefit from the soundness of the 
banking system, but these stimuli may not necessarily 
translate into additional lending and economic activity 
if banks need to re-establish the solidity of their balance 
sheets.
Finally, Figure 5 compares the effects of unconventional 
monetary policy measures with those arising from 
standard conventional monetary policy shocks, and 
plots the peak responses of inflation and output growth, 
grouped by interquartile ranges, to a UMP shock which 
increases the annual rate of growth of the ECB’s total 
assets by one percent.2 Regarding the effects on 
inflation, Estonia features the highest increase (about 
0.10%), followed by Latvia, Luxembourg, and Spain 
(about 0.06%), while the smallest effects are observed 
in France, Germany, and Italy (about 0.03%). With 
respect to the effects on output growth, Baltic countries 
feature the highest increases, while interestingly, effects 
are negligible in Spain, or not statistically significant in 
Portugal and Greece.
In order to assess the role of cross-country spillovers in 
the transmission of unconventional monetary policies, 
the previous results are compared with those obtained 
in a model in which cross-country linkages are not 
taken into account. Figure 3 plots the peak responses 
of output growth and inflation, decomposed into direct 
effects and spillovers. We point out two results. First, 
spillover effects dramatically amplify the effects: once 
accounting for spillovers, the average peak effects on 
output growth and inflation roughly double (from 0.03% 
to 0.06% for output, from 0.03% to 0.05% for inflation). 
Second, a substantial part of the heterogeneity in 
effects is due to cross-country interactions: when 
spillover effects are taken into account, the range of 
responses of output growth increases (from [0.02% - 
0.12%] to [0.03% - 0.31%]), as does the range 
of responses of inflation (from [0% - 0.07%] to [0.01% 
- 0.11%]).
2  Note that sign restrictions identify a portion of the parameter 
space, rather than a unique parameter estimate. Therefore, 
when we report the effect of a UMP shock we are referring to 
the median estimate from a distribution of effects associated 
with many different parameterizations consistent with our 
sign restrictions.
GEOGRAPHIC VARIATION OF RESPONSES TO UMP SHOCKS FIGURE 2
INFLATION OUTPUT GROWTH
 ( .035, .045] ( .007, .035]  Not euro area  ( .063, .085] ( .028, .063]  Not euro area ( .050, .106] ( .045, .050]  ( .160, .311] ( .085, .160]
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NOTES TO FIGURE 5: the x-scale measures the country-specific effects of a reduction in the official interest rate (conventional monetary policy shock), while the 
y-scale measures the effects of an expansion of central bank’s balance sheet (unconventional monetary policy shock). Both shocks are scaled to give a 1% peak 
effect on output growth of the euro area. For new credit operations we report the peak response, while for cost of credit we report the maximum fall, which 
equals the trough response with reversed sign. 45 degrees line in solid black. In our sample, data on new credit operations and cost of credit are available for 
ten and four countries, respectively. 
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shows that unconventional measures have been 
particularly effective in reducing firms’ financing costs 
and boosting credit. 
Conclusions
We provide an assessment of the macroeconomic and 
financial effects of the ECB´s recent unconventional 
monetary policies by estimating a global VAR which 
includes all the current members of the monetary union. 
The multi-country structure of the GVAR explicitly takes 
into account national macro-financial dynamics as well 
as cross-country interdependencies. This allows us to 
better capture the relevant transmission channels of 
monetary policy, as well as to properly assess the size 
and dispersion of the effects of UMP shocks across 
euro area countries. 
Unconventional monetary policies have beneficial 
effects on aggregate output and inflation, confirming 
their role as a stabilization tool. Most euro area 
members benefit from UMP shocks, but with a 
substantial degree of heterogeneity. Part of this 
dispersion is attributable to spillover effects, which 
substantially amplify the effects of UMP shocks. 
Interestingly, countries with less fragile banking 
systems benefit the most from unconventional 
monetary policies. This result suggests the existence of 
a potential bottleneck in the effectiveness of 
unconventional monetary policies which works via the 
bank lending channel. When comparing the effects of 
UMP shocks with those arising from conventional 
reductions in the official rate, we find that unconventional 
measures are particularly effective in reducing firms’ 
financing costs and boosting credit. We read this 
evidence as suggesting that the ECB’s unconventional 
monetary policies, thanks to their more targeted nature, 
have helped reduce financial fragmentation and thus to 
expand credit.
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ON THE DETERMINANTS OF FISCAL NON-COMPLIANCE
MAR DELGADO, VICTOR LLEDÓ AND JAVIER PÉREZ
WORKING PAPER Nº 1632
1 Motivation 1
The process of fiscal consolidation that has taken place 
in Europe in the aftermath of the global and euro 
sovereign debt crisis has brought the challenges posed 
by enforcement of fiscal discipline in federal or 
decentralized countries to the forefront of policy 
discussions. A number of papers have looked at this 
issue from a cross-country perspective, but some 
lessons can also be extracted by looking at regions 
within a country. Typically, extant studies focus on 
understanding the determinants of cross-country or 
regional fiscal non-compliance, defined as the 
difference between fiscal targets and outcomes. 
There are two strands of the literature that analyses 
determinants of non-compliance. One focuses on “soft 
government budget constraints”, while the other looks 
at factors determining fiscal forecast errors. The former 
is rooted in the fiscal federalism theory: non-compliance 
with fiscal targets is due to the presence of soft budget 
constraints at the subnational level, which arise from 
the inability of the Central Government (CG) to credibly 
commit to not bailing out Subnational Governments 
(SNGs). As a result, SNGs do not restrain fiscal 
outcomes as firmly as economic fundamentals would 
require. Soft budget constraints have been shown to 
be driven by political motives. They are aggravated by 
flawed intergovernmental fiscal institutions, including 
large vertical fiscal imbalances (VFIs), weak fiscal rules, 
and limited market discipline2. The second strand of 
the literature is a smaller, but growing, body of empirical 
work dealing with the implementation of fiscal 
consolidations. Rather than asking why fiscal outcomes 
cannot be constrained ex ante, and targets enforced, it 
investigates whether fiscal targets, and the forecasts 
on which they are based, are set appropriately.
This paper considers a new framework that unifies 
aspects of both these approaches. Our framework 
distinguishes between voluntary and involuntary non-
compliance, taking into account both the capacity and 
the willingness to comply. The study analyses Spain’s 
regions, which make for a relevant case study, given 
the high degree of fiscal decentralization of the country, 
which has evolved steadily over the past decades. In 
spite of its strict framework of national and supranational 
fiscal rules, Spain’s regions have displayed persistent 
fiscal non-compliance over the past twelve years, as 
shown in the following chart. Moreover, this non-
compliance led to the implementation of bail-out funds 
by the CG, which provided market-based funding to 
SNGs in exchange for heightened control over the 
conduct of regional fiscal policies. In many Spanish 
regions, the VFI is very large.3 In fact, the average VFI in 
2014 was near 65%, with a minimum of 30% and a 
maximum near 100%.
3  This study measures a region’s VFI as 1-r⁄ s, where own 
revenue r corresponds to a region’s total revenue minus 
transfers received by the SNG from the central government 
and other public entities, while own spending s is a region’s 
total spending minus transfers paid by the SNG to the central 
government and other public entities.
1  This entry is based on the paper “On the determinants of fiscal 
non-compliance: an empirical analysis of Spain’s regions”, by 
Mar Delgado-Tellez, Victor Lledó, and Javier J.Pérez, Banco 
de España Working Paper 1632. Forthcoming in Fiscal 
Politics (2017), edited by Victor Gaspar, Sanjeev Gupta, and 
Carlos Mulas-Granados (Washington: IMF). 
2  See, e.g., Rodden, J., G. Eskelund, and J. Litvack, 2003, 
“Introduction and Overview” in Rodden, J., G. Eskelund. G., 
and J. Litvack, eds, Fiscal Decentralization and the Challenge 
of Hard Budget Constraints, pp. 1–31, (Cambridge: MIT 
Press), and Ter Minassian, T., 2015, “Promoting Responsible 
and Sustainable Fiscal Decentralization”, in Ahmad, E. and G. 
Brosio, eds., Handbook of Multilevel Finance, (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar Publishing).
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where INVOL and VOL are vectors including the 
involuntary and voluntary determinants, respectively; η 
and ρ are, respectively, country and time fixed effects, 
α measures the persistence of the non-compliance 
behaviour, and γ and δ measure the relative impact of 
involuntary and voluntary factors on fiscal compliance. 
2.3 Main Hypotheses
In decentralised countries, fiscal compliance of all tiers 
of government is crucial to ensure fiscal stability. The 
distinction between voluntary and involuntary 
determinants of SNG fiscal non-compliance enables a 
better understanding of regional fiscal behaviour. 
Involuntary non-compliance should depend negatively 
on favourable economic shocks such as unexpectedly 
high economic growth, and favourable conditions such 
as growth or inflation above the average of other 
regions. Hence, the growth forecast error and the 
deviations of growth and inflation from the mean are 
expected to have a positive impact on the fiscal 
compliance margin (see table below). Another variable 
that may explain involuntary non-compliance is the 
required fiscal adjustment, which is defined as the 
difference between the fiscal target and the fiscal 
outcome in the previous year. Therefore, greater 
required adjustment implies a stricter target that is 
more difficult to comply with.
Meanwhile, voluntary non-compliance could depend 
on multiple factors: region size, fiscal autonomy, market 
discipline, fiscal rules, political representation, electoral 
years and political autonomy. First, a SNG may avoid 
compliance because the region is relatively big 
(measured by GDP or by population), giving it stronger 
negotiating power to convince the Central Government 
to rescue it. But on the other hand, in the case of a 
small region, the SNG may avoid compliance because 
of the small cost of its bailout. Given these offsetting 
effects on the bargaining situation, the impact of 
regional size is expected to be ambiguous. 
The degree of fiscal autonomy would be expected to 
have a positive impact on the compliance margin, since 
regions with larger fiscal autonomy would have more 
capacity to adapt their income and spending. Likewise, 
the degree of market discipline, and the strength of 
fiscal rules, would also be expected to have a positive 
impact, as they are directly related with the negative 
consequences of non-compliance. 
On the other hand, upcoming electoral dates are 
expected to have a negative impact on compliance 
behaviour, since compliance could entail a politically 
2 Framework and main results
2.1 Game specification
The model differentiates voluntary from involuntary 
non-compliance, considering it as voluntary when the 
SNG has the capacity but not the incentives to comply, 
and involuntary when despite the willingness to comply, 
the SNG is not capable of doing so. 
The classification can be interpreted in terms of a 
dynamic game. SNG non-compliance occurs in two 
situations: whenever the target chosen by the CG is 
feasible but the Regional Government chooses not to 
comply (voluntary non-compliance), and when the 
target chosen is not feasible (involuntary non-
compliance). 
A possible cause of involuntary non-compliance is that 
in periods of fiscal stress, CGs face increasing 
(domestic or supranational) political pressures to 
ensure that fiscal consolidation targets at the general 
government level are met. To minimize the political 
costs such pressures entail, CGs may “pass the buck” 
of the adjustment down to SNGs. This leads to 
ambitious, but (initially) feasible centre-imposed SNG 
fiscal targets that may become infeasible once fiscal 
and macro shocks materialize.
2.2 Empirical Analysis
The empirical analysis will therefore focus on the 
determinants of the fiscal compliance margin, defined 
as the difference between the fiscal outcome and the 
target: f e = f - f *, a positive margin meaning compliance. 
The analysis is based on a dynamic panel regression 
following the Arellano-Bond first-difference generalized 
method of moments approach. The regression model is 
based on the following equation:
f i t  = α f it - 1 + γ INVOL it + δ VOL it + η i + ρ t + ϵ it ,
CG chooses
target
RG chooses
not to comply
Target ex-post
feasible
Target ex-post
infeasible
RG chooses
to comply
VOLUNTARY INVOLUNTARY
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In relation with voluntary non-compliance, VFIs have a 
negative impact on compliance, as expected, since a 
large disequilibrium between own income and 
expenditure implies less incentives to comply. That is, 
large VFIs imply a lack of co-responsibility, which allows 
SNGs to blame non-compliance on the design of the 
financing system. We also hypothesized that a larger 
share of investment and basic social services over total 
spending would have a positive impact on compliance, 
because it would entail greater expenditure autonomy. 
Nevertheless, the estimated impact is negative, 
probably showing that these particular expenditures 
tend to be more rigid, and difficult to adjust to economic 
shocks. In relation with market discipline, only the 
implicit interest rate seems to have a direct and 
significant impact on the compliance margin. Interest 
rates rose during the first years of the crisis, while falling 
in later years, due to the implementation of Central 
Government funds to finance SNG debt. 
Finally, while fiscal rules do not seem to have had a 
significant impact, electoral dates do. The compliance 
margin seems to fall whenever there are regional or 
national elections, suggesting that SNGs prefer not to 
costly social spending cut or tax increase. Similarly, 
other political factors may also affect compliance 
behaviour, because if the region is politically strong, it 
may expect to avoid sanctions for fiscal non-compliance. 
2.4 Empirical results
The empirical results bore out some of the key 
hypotheses. All the variables expected to affect 
involuntary non-compliance seem to have a significant 
impact. Growth forecast errors and required adjustment 
work in the expected direction, while regional GDP 
growth and CPI differentials over national growth have a 
significant effect of unexpected sign. The impact of the 
required adjustment is arguably attributable to ambitious 
and rigid fiscal targets set by the CG as a result of 
national and supranational pressures for General 
Government consolidation, as discussed above. 
Overall, these variables are related with the difficulty of 
meeting the target, because if GDP grows less than 
expected or the required adjustment is too large, the 
target could be infeasible. In addition, the compliance 
margin appears to have a strong inertial behaviour.
                                        
stluser laciripmEtceffe detcepxEelbairaVlennahC
I) Voluntary 
Spillovers
Region size: Region weight in National Population, 
GDP, and GDP per capita
 positive/negative —
—evitisopymonotua xaTymonotuA lacsiF
evitagenevitisoperutidnepxe latot ni tnemtsevni fo erahS
evitagenevitisoperutidnepxe latot ni seicivres cisab fo erahS
evitagenevitagensecnalabmI lacsiF lacitreV
evitisopevitisoptseretni ticilpmi ni egnahc launna deggaLenilpicsid tekraM
—evitagengnitar ni egnahc launna deggaL
Ratio securities over loans  positive/negative —
—evitisophtgnerts selur lacsiFseluR lacsiF
—evitagennoitatneserper yratnemailrap fo eziSnoitatneserpeR lacitiloP
evitagenevitagensnoitilaoc lanoitan dna lanoiger fo ecneurgnoC
evitagenevitagenraey noitcele lanoigeRsnoitcelE
evitagenevitagenraey noitcele lanoitaN
—evitagenseitrap ymonotua-orp fo noitatneserper lanoigeRymonotuA lacitiloP
II) Involuntary
evitisopevitisoprorre tsacerof htworGskcohS
evitagenevitisoplaitnereffid htworg PDG laer lanoitan/lanoigeR
evitagenevitisoplaitnereffid htworg IPC lanoitan/lanoigeR
evitagenevitagenraey suoiverp emoctuo lacsif ’ssunim tegrat lacsiFtnemtsujda deriuqeR
III) Others
evitisopevitisopsraey suoiverp fo ecnailpmoCaitrenI
TABLE 1DETERMINANTS OF FISCAL COMPLIANCE, fe
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each region’s initial situation may be crucial for a 
credible target policy, as unachievable targets tend not 
to be binding. Nevertheless, individualized targets may 
lead to moral hazard, reducing the incentives for sound 
fiscal policy in good times, as SNGs come to expect 
additional room for manoeuver if they enter a crisis in a 
weak fiscal position. The strict implementation of fiscal 
rules is crucial for promoting ex ante fiscal margins 
against adverse shocks, and to guarantee that the 
heterogeneity of structural fiscal positions among 
regions in normal times is minimized. Second, our 
results for Spain show that the occurrence of 
subnational fiscal crises cannot be ruled out even when 
national fiscal rules are fairly credible and intergovern-
mental fiscal responsibilities are appropriately assigned. 
From this point of view, the recent Spanish experience 
suggests that granting regions additional instruments 
to prevent liquidity crises could be useful, so that 
pressure on the CG to support or bail out SNGs is 
reduced. In particular, the development of tools to 
support regions’ continued access to financial markets 
even in periods of fiscal stress is crucial.6 
cut expenditure or raise taxes when they face the polls, 
because of the unpopularity of these measures. Also, 
when the ruling political party of the CG coincides with 
the one in power at the regional level, the compliance 
margin falls, perhaps because of the expectation of an 
easier bailout.
3 Policy discussion
The main policy lesson of our analysis is that enhancing 
fiscal compliance in multi-level governance systems 
requires a comprehensive assessment of inter-
governmental fiscal arrangements that goes beyond 
strengthening formal rule-monitoring and enforcement 
procedures. Key issues to consider include: (i) the 
assignment of revenue-raising and spending mandates 
(to deal with VFIs); and (ii) how the burden of fiscal 
consolidations should be shared, and how this affects 
the setting of fiscal deficit targets. The assessment 
should be accompanied by a focus on making CG 
enforcement politically credible. From the latter 
perspective, our findings are mainly tailored to the 
fiscally decentralized setting of Spain, but also bear 
some lessons for multi-country arrangements. 
More specifically, as regards the rules-based 
framework, our analysis suggests that there is still 
scope to further strengthen existing fiscal control 
procedures by making their activation more automatic 
and by tightening the legal requirements to publicly 
explain deviations from fiscal targets.4 Such measures 
may prove particularly important during election years, 
when the political costs for the CG in enforcing targets 
are more salient and our results show that non-
compliance is more pervasive. Concerning inter-
governmental fiscal responsibilities, our analysis 
highlights the need to revisit, and possibly reduce, 
existing VFIs by ensuring SNGs’ revenue-raising and 
borrowing mandates are consistent with their spending 
mandates.5 This would help strengthen SNG fiscal 
autonomy and policy accountability, and could make 
the enforcement of SNG fiscal deficit targets politically 
less costly and more credible. Finally, as to burden 
sharing in consolidations, our results suggest that the 
credibility of fiscal targets is linked to their feasibility. 
These policy conclusion need some qualifications, 
though. First, reasonable fiscal targets that consider 
4  Lledó, V., 2015, “Coordinating Fiscal Consolidation in Spain: 
Progress, Challenges, and Prospects”, in IMF (ed), “Spain: 
Selected Issues”, IMF Country Report No. 15/233, 
(Washington: IMF).
5  This is in line with previous work looking at the effectiveness 
of subnational fiscal rules (Kotia and Lledó, 2015). 
6  Delgado Tellez, M., C. I. González and J. J. Pérez, 2016, 
“Regional government access to market funding: international 
experience and recent developments”, Banco de España 
Economic Bulletin, February 2016.
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the tasks performed at work, for adults aged 16-65 in 
24 countries or sub-national entities. Our sample is 
restricted to the thirteen countries (the Czech Republic, 
Spain, Estonia, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Korea, 
the UK (excluding Scotland and Wales), the Netherlands, 
Norway, the Slovak Republic and Sweden) with the 
largest sample sizes and more detailed information 
about the number of years of working experience and 
age. We pool employed and unemployed individuals as 
well as females and males between 16 and 55 years of 
age but exclude those workers who have not had any 
labour market experience.
With this information, we construct the following 
variables:
•   Formal education. We group individuals in three 
schooling levels (primary education or less, 
baccalaureate studies or forms of non-university 
vocational training, and university education). 
The fraction of prime workers with basic 
schooling only is 19% in the full sample, being 
highest in Italy (47%) and lowest in the Czech 
Republic (6%).
•   Tasks. We classify tasks as either numeracy-
related (elaborating a budget, using a calculator, 
reading bills, using fractions or percentages, 
reading diagrams, elaborating graphs or using 
algebra) or literacy-related (reading email, 
reading guides, reading manuals, writing emails, 
writing reports, reading articles, reading 
academic journals, reading books and writing 
articles). We use the number of tasks performed 
within each class, and the frequency with which 
they are performed at work, to construct 
intensity-adjusted indicators of numeric and 
literacy tasks. We also distinguish between 
simple and advanced tasks. 
The fraction of individuals who report having performed 
at most a basic task is larger among those with basic 
schooling than among those with college. Moreover, 
the fraction of respondents having performed advanced 
tasks increases with schooling in all the countries. 
Finally, between one quarter and one third of individuals 
with basic schooling perform at least one of the 
simplest tasks. The variation in the fraction of 
EDUCATION, LABOUR MARKET EXPERIENCE AND COGNITIVE 
SKILLS: EVIDENCE FROM PIAAC 1
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MARTA MARTÍNEZ-MATUTE, AND ERNESTO VILLANUEVA 
WORKING PAPER Nº 1635
1 Introduction
Formal education and labour market experience are 
often assumed to be good proxies of workers’ skills 
and, hence, of labour productivity. Recently, the OECD 
Program for the International Assessment of Adult 
Competences (PIAAC), an international study assessing 
adults’ numeracy and literacy, has provided new 
evidence regarding the impact of different types of 
work experience and formal education on objective 
measures of skills. Among other things, it makes it 
possible to analyse how different tasks performed by 
workers of different education levels correlate with 
measures of cognitive abilities (see OECD, 2013). 
To estimate the impact of experience and education on 
workers’ skills using this data, there are some 
identification issues (unobserved heterogeneity in initial 
skills and human capital, and selection into jobs 
requiring different tasks) that need to be tackled. We do 
so by constructing relative measures of skills for each 
individual, using both the results of the numerical and 
the literacy test, and constructing alternative measures 
of job tasks. Results suggest that for individuals with 
compulsory schooling, work experience substitutes for 
formal education in the acquisition of skills, since the 
number of years of working experience correlates 
positively with performance in PIAAC tests, particularly 
among less-educated individuals. Moreover, young 
people with low levels of schooling who are employed 
at jobs intensive in numeric tasks, relative to reading 
tasks, also perform better on the numeracy section of 
the PIAAC test than the reading part. Overall, given the 
size of the impact and its heterogeneity across groups, 
the contribution of on-the-job learning to skill formation 
is a quarter of that of compulsory schooling in the 
countries we analyze. 
Data
Between August 2011 and March 2012, PIAAC 
collected data on literacy and numeracy, as well as on 
1  The working paper on which this feature is based was written 
as support material to the presentation report of the PIAAC 
study. We thank Luis Miguel Sanz, Francisco García Crespo 
and Ismael Sanz their help with the database and, especially, 
Inge Kukla for her excellent assistance.
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respondents with a college degree who report having 
performed advanced tasks is much higher. Thus, there 
is a nontrivial share of individuals with basic schooling 
who perform simple tasks at their jobs –having at least 
the possibility of using and acquiring some skills.  For 
example, among workers with basic schooling, 
salespersons or builders are specialized in numerical 
tasks, while personal care or health workers are much 
more likely to report reading tasks. As preliminary 
evidence of the correlation of particular job market 
experiences and workers’ skills, Figures 1 and 2 plot 
relative task specialization against the difference in test 
scores, both at the two-digit occupation level and 
across industries. Workers in occupations or sectors 
where math-oriented tasks prevail perform relatively 
better in the numeracy test.
Methodology
To measure whether on-the-job experience helps build 
skills, we study the following relationship:
C m= α 0,m+ α 1,m S + α 2,m J + α 3,m J * S + C 0 +ε m          m = n,l    
where C m in the PIAAC score (in either numerical, n, or 
literacy, l, tests),2 S is formal education, J is the task-
content of their job, C 0 (unobserved) is initial 
endowment of human capital (or some measure of the 
innate ability of a worker). J denotes the specific skill 
content of the current or last job, and reflects the 
extent to which an individual performs particular tasks 
with numeracy or literacy content. Finally, ε m is an 
unobserved factor which is uncorrelated with the initial 
overall ability C 0 , but which reflects the initial 
endowment of a particular type of human capital C m . 
Our parameter of interest is α 2  , that is, the impact of 
tasks on the job on the skills measure C m . 
If workers of greater overall ability perform more tasks, 
the coefficient α 2, m in the previous equation will 
overestimate the effect of task performance on skill 
accumulation. Hence, to address unobserved 
heterogeneity in overall ability, we instead study the 
relation between specialization in numerical tasks 
relative to reading and differential performance in 
numeracy tests relative to literacy tests, For this 
purpose, we assume that the impact of on-the-job 
numerical tasks on numerical ability and the impact of 
on-the-job literacy tasks on reading ability have a 
similar order of magnitude. That is, imposing α 2, n = α 2, l , 
we estimate the following equation: 
C n - C l = [α 0, n - α 0, l  ] +[α 1, n - α 1, l ] S + α 2 [n-l]+α 3 [n-l] * S + ε n - ε l
Our emphasis on relative performance reflects studies in 
the economics of education which have used students’ 
scores to study subject-specific interventions on cognitive 
ability – see Bietenbeck (2014) or Silva et al. (2012).
Another source of bias in the estimation of α 2 is that 
workers with higher values of ε n -ε l (those with a 
comparative advantage in numeracy tasks) are likely 
to sort into jobs with a relatively heavier math content 
–i.e., with a higher level of [n-l]. Sorting thus generates 
2  To be precise, in our regressions, C m is the PIACC score in test 
m, normalized by the standard deviation of the score on that test.
DIFFERENTIAL NUMERACY-LITERACY SCORE VS. DIFFERENTIAL TASKS (RESPONDENTS WITH PRIMARY SCHOOLING)
Figure 1 
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Numeracy - literacy tasks (frequency-adjusted)
Figure 2
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SOURCE: PIAAC.
a Sample includes respondents 16 to 45 old with basic schooling only.  
b Data from Spain, Italy, Ireland, UK, Sweden, Norway, Estonia and Netherlands (countries with larger samples of individuals with basic schooling).
c Y axis: differential score between the numeric and literacy test. X axis: difference between the (frequency-adjusted) proportion of numeric tasks done at least 
once during the last month over all plausible numeric tasks and the (frequency-adjusted) proportion of literacy tasks done at least once during the last month 
over the all plausible literacy tasks. 
d Y axis: differential score between the numeric and literacy test. X axis: the difference between the proportion of numeric tasks performed at least once during 
the last month relative to the proportion of literacy tasks.
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Results
Table 1 presents the estimates of the impact of 
numerical job tasks on numerical skills, both in relative 
terms with respect to literacy tasks and skills. We use 
two different samples for the estimation, young workers 
(16-35 years of age) and the whole sample (individuals 
aged 16-55). We also present two different measures of 
job task intensity. The first column of each sample 
measures specialization in the numerical task as the 
difference between the proportion of numerical and 
literacy tasks reported performed. The second column 
presents a similar measure, adjusted by the fraction of 
working time devoted to each task. We report only the 
coefficients for the pooled samples of 13 countries.
Consistently across all the estimated regressions, relative 
to workers whose jobs have a similar incidence of 
numeric and literacy tasks, workers with basic schooling 
in jobs that fully specialize in numerical tasks (implying 
n - l = 1 ) perform 15.6% of one standard deviation better 
in the numeracy test than in the reading test (Table 1, row 
1, specification (3)). When adjusting by the fraction of 
time devoted to numerical tasks, we find that workers 
who fully specialize in numerical tasks by conducting all 
numerical tasks on their jobs every day score 20% of one 
standard deviation higher in the numeracy than in the 
reading score (Table 1, row 1, specification (4)). The 
impact of full specialization in numerical tasks is largest 
among the youngest cohorts and, among youths, it is 
reduced to a half among workers with a high school or a 
college degree.  Overall, the results are consistent with 
the notion that conducting particular tasks on the job 
increases the skills of workers with basic schooling, and 
that the effect is strongest for the youngest cohorts, who 
are accumulating their first years of experience.
As mentioned above, we can recover an estimate of the 
degree of sorting into numeracy-intensive jobs by 
examining how basic (as opposed to advanced) tasks 
increase test scores within groups with higher-than-basic 
schooling levels (with either a high school or a college 
degree). Those estimates are presented in Table 2.
Adjusting for the frequency of tasks on the job, a 
respondent with basic schooling who performs 
everyday all the basic numerical tasks we consider 
performs between 11.7% and 25% of one standard 
deviation better in the numerical test than in the reading 
one, compared to a worker who does not specialize 
(Table 2, row 1, specifications (4) and (2)). The 11.7% 
estimate is obtained in a sample that includes 
individuals aged 16-55, while the impact of 25% is 
a positive correlation between the numeracy content 
of a job and initial endowment of numeracy-related 
human capital. We deal with this problem by exploiting 
the heterogeneity in the degree of task sophistication, 
which allows us to identify a group of the population 
for which all the difference between measured 
numeracy and literacy skills is due to selection. Thus, 
we assume that performing simple numeric tasks at 
the job does not have a causal effect on the difference 
between numeracy and literacy skills for workers with a 
college or high school degree. This assumption 
formalizes the finding that once relevant individual 
characteristics are held constant, workers who are 
overskilled for their job do not earn higher wages than 
better matched workers – see Mavrovaras et al. (2013) 
or Leuven and Osterbeek (2011). On the other hand, 
survey data on voluntary job movers does support the 
hypothesis that workers sort into jobs that match their 
skills. For example, very few German workers move 
voluntarily to jobs requiring skills different from those 
they have, and those who do require sizeable wage 
increases – see Villanueva (2007).
Under these two identifying assumptions, we proceed 
as follows. We first restrict the sample to workers with 
only basic schooling, and regress the difference 
between the (normalized) numeracy and literacy scores 
on the performance of simple numeric tasks relative to 
reading tasks. The resulting estimate of α 2 measures 
both the causal impact of performing numeric tasks on 
the normalized numeracy score plus a sorting 
component. The second step is to estimate the same 
regression for a sample of individuals with either a high 
school or a college degree, for whom the corresponding 
coefficient only reflects sorting. We then measure the 
coefficient of interest as the difference between the 
estimates of α 2 in the two previous regressions. One 
can view this approach as a difference-in-difference 
strategy, where the treatment is the presence of tasks 
on the job and the control group are workers with a 
college or high school degree. Knowing that the 
second assumption might be too strong, at least the 
identification strategy should provide a lower bound 
for the average effect on the least educated, since one 
might argue that the effect of basic tasks on the test 
score should be most pronounced for workers with 
less education, while the selection issue should be 
most important for more educated workers.3
3  See for example Charles et al. (2016), for evidence that highly-
educated workers are more mobile than those with less 
education.
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Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
0.173***
(0.024) (0.064) (0.018) (0.036)
-0.081***
(0.025) (0.069)
-0.044***
(0.0269)
Average number of obs. 
570.0570.0680.0090.02R egarevA
3. (Numeracy-Literacy tasks)*College
806,05977,81
Dependent variable: (Normalized numeracy score-Normalized literacy score)
Respondents 16-35 years of age Respondents 16-55 years of age
1. (Numeracy-Literacy tasks)
2. (Numeracy-Literacy tasks) * High school
TABLE 1THE IMPACT OF TASK SPECIALIZATION ON RELATIVE PERFORMANCE IN NUMERACY AND LITERACY SCORE 
(ALL FORMS OF TASKS) (a, b, d, e, f)
0.338*** 0.156*** 0.199***
-0.161** -0.053*** -0.031***
(0.0212) (0.0217)
(0.069) (0.020) (0.039)
-0.12*** -0.047** 0.010**
                                        
Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
0.124***
(0.037)
-0.069*
(0.041)
-0.083*
(0.043) (0.051) (0.026) (0.030)
0.034
(0.034) (0.055)
0.01
(0.037) (0.072)
0.066**
(0.037)
Obs.
401.0890.0680.0580.02R
Dependent variable: (Normalized numeracy score-Normalized literacy score)
Respondents 16-35 years of age Respondents 16-55 years of age
1. (Numeracy-Literacy tasks) basic
2. (Numeracy-Literacy tasks) basic * High school
3. (Numeracy-Literacy tasks) basic * College
806,05977,81
4. (Numeracy-Literacy tasks) advanced
5. (Numeracy-Literacy tasks) advanced * High school
6. (Numeracy-Literacy tasks) advanced * College
ADJUSTING FOR SELECTION: THE IMPACT OF SPECIALIZATION ON BASIC TASKS ON RELATIVE PERFORMANCE 
IN NUMERACY AND LITERACY SCORE (a, c, d, e, f)
TABLE 2
0.253***
(0.045)
-0.156***
(0.050)
-0.140**
0.048
0.036
0.082
(0.070)
0.069*** 0.117**
(0.022) (0.026)
-0.012 -0.012
(0.021) (0.029)
-0.023 -0.008
0.049 0.109*
(0.033) (0.041)
0.010 -0.039
(0.037) (0.044)
0.047 0.00
(0.037) (0.044)
SOURCES: PIAAC in Czech Republic, Spain, Estonia, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Korea, UK (excluding Scotland and Wales), Netherlands, Norway, Slovak 
Republic and Sweden.
a The dependent variable is the individual-specific difference between the score in the numeracy test and the score in the literacy test, each normalized by its 
standard deviation.
b In Columns (1) and (3), "numeracy tasks" is the fraction of all numeracy tasks that the respondent reports having performed on the job (current or last). "Literacy 
tasks" is the fraction of literacy tasks reported.
The difference "numeracy-literacy tasks" is the degree of specialization in one type of tasks. It takes value 1 if the individual performs all the numeric tasks on 
the job, and none of the literacy ones. 
c In Columns (1) and (3), "Basic numeracy (literacy) tasks" is the fraction of basic numeracy (literacy) tasks that the respondent reports having performed on the 
job (current or last). The difference between the two indicates the degree of specialization in one type of basic tasks.
Basic (advanced) numeracy tasks include elaborating a budget, using a calculator, reading bills, using fractions or percentages or reading diagrams 
(elaborating graphs or using algebra).
Basic (advanced) reading tasks include reading email, reading guides, reading manuals, writing emails, writing reports or reading articles (reading academic 
journals, books or writing articles).
d In Cols. (2) and (4), numeracy and literacy tasks are defined as in Cols. (1) and (3), but each task is weighted by its frequency.
e The additional regressors (not shown) include a quadratic polynomial of years of working experience, two indicators of the educational level of the respondent 
(high school and college), the interaction between education and years of working experience, and age dummies (grouped in 5 year bands), among others.
Each estimate is the average of 10 different regressions. Standard errors are adjusted by multiple imputation and, within each implicate, by heteroscedasticity.
f ***,**,* over an estimate denote that the estimate is statistically different from zero at the 99th, 95th and 90th confidence level, respectively.
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Concluding remarks
This paper studies how on-the-job learning contributes 
to the acquisition of numeracy and literacy skills in a 
pool of countries that implemented the PIAAC survey, 
focusing on individuals with low levels of schooling. Our 
findings have some implications for the design of active 
labour market policies and specifically whether funds 
should be directed to training or other types of 
instruments such as orientation or targeted social 
security rebates. A large fraction of the unemployed 
have basic schooling. Our results imply that their 
previous experience and tasks –even in basic jobs – are 
useful predictors of their skills and future employability. 
Secondly, performing specific tasks on the job might 
contribute to increasing cognitive skills for less-educated 
individuals. While the tentative rate of return to on-the-
job training that we have estimated is about a quarter of 
that of formal schooling, the costs of increasing school 
attendance for prime aged workers may be substantial.
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estimated in the sample of respondents who were 
between 16-35 years of age in 2011-2012. 
When we estimate the degree of sorting, we find that a 
respondent with a high school or college degree who 
fully specializes in basic tasks performs about 10% of 
one standard deviation better in the numeracy test 
relative to the reading test, compared to a similar 
worker who does not specialize. For example, among 
16-35 year old high-school educated respondents, by 
summing the coefficients in the first two rows for 
specification (2), we find that full frequency-adjusted 
specialization in numerical tasks increases relative 
performance on the numeracy test by 9.7% (0.253 - 
0.156 = 0.097), an effect we attribute to sorting. Similar 
estimates are obtained across different cohorts 
(comparing specifications (1) and (2) to (3) and (4)), and 
are little changed by estimating sorting by looking at 
college-educated rather than high-school educated 
workers (looking at row 3 rather than row 2). 
Overall, the results are consistent with the hypothesis 
that for young workers with basic schooling, on-the-job 
learning may be a substitute for formal schooling. 
However, that is a qualitative assessment. Our more 
conservative estimates suggest that, among 16-35 year-
olds, individuals with basic education who are specialized 
in numeracy tasks obtain a numerical score that is about 
12.4% of one standard deviation higher (Table 2, row 1, 
specification (1)). If we further assume that there are 
selection effects which can be identified by the impact 
of specialization in basic numerical tasks on numeracy 
scores among college graduates (this impact is 
0.124 - 0.083 = 4.1%), then the implied estimate of the 
skill-accumulation effect on those with basic schooling 
would be 8.3% of one standard deviation.
Under the (again) conservative assumption that 
workers conducted numerical or literacy tasks during 
12 years of experience (the sample average), one year 
of experience increases numeracy skills by between 
0.67% ( = 8.3/12) and 1% ( = 12.4/12) of one standard 
deviation (the first estimate accounts for sorting, while 
the second does not). Hanushek et al. (2015) estimate 
that increasing compulsory education by one year 
increases skills by between 2.7% and 2.9% of one 
standard deviation in the United States. Hence, one 
extra year of schooling would be equivalent to between 
2.7 ( = 2.7/1) and 4.3 years ( = 2.9/0.67) of on-the-job 
learning.
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A SPECTRAL EM ALGORITHM FOR DYNAMIC FACTOR MODELS
GABRIELE FIORENTINI, ALESSANDRO GALESI AND ENRIQUE SENTANA
WORKING PAPER Nº 1619
We make two complementary contributions to efficiently 
estimate dynamic factor models: a frequency domain 
EM algorithm and a swift iterated indirect inference 
procedure for ARMA models with no asymptotic 
efficiency loss for any finite number of iterations. 
Although our procedures can estimate such models 
with many series without good initial values, near the 
optimum we recommend switching to a gradient 
method that analytically computes spectral scores 
using the EM principle. We successfully employ our 
methods to construct an index that captures the 
common movements of US sectoral employment 
growth rates, which we compare to the indices obtained 
by semiparametric methods. 
SPANISH PUBLIC FINANCES THROUGH THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
FRANCISCO MARTÍ AND JAVIER J. PÉREZ
WORKING PAPER Nº 1620
Spain’s public finances have been under significant 
stress during the crisis, despite precrisis fiscal surpluses 
and low levels of public debt. The impact of the crisis 
and an initial phase of counter-cyclical activism 
exacerbated the existing (structural) fiscal 
vulnerabilities. To correct the fiscal imbalances, a 
significant number of bold policy actions were taken, 
affecting taxation, public spending, national fiscal rules 
and the structure of the public sector. In this paper we 
discuss the evolution of public finances in Spain during 
the financial crisis, framing crisis-related fiscal policy 
measures within medium-term economic trends and 
focusing on policy responses to the financial crisis. We 
also touch upon the main policy challenges ahead.
THE DETERMINANTS OF LONG-TERM DEBT ISSUANCE  
BY EUROPEAN BANKS: EVIDENCE OF TWO CRISES
ADRIAN VAN RIXTEL, LUNA ROMO GONZÁLEZ AND JING YANG
WORKING PAPER Nº 1621
This paper is one of the first to investigate the 
determinants of bond issuance by European banks. 
We use a unique database of around 50,000 bonds 
issued by 63 banks from 14 European countries to test 
explicitly a broad set of hypotheses on the drivers of 
bond issuance. The sample covers the two major 
financial crises that caused severe dislocations in bank 
funding structures, i.e. the global financial crisis of 
2008-2009 and the euro area financial crisis of 2010-
2012. Our findings suggest that “market timing” (low 
interest rates) drove issuance before but not during the 
crisis, when access to funding became more important 
than its cost. Moreover, during the crisis years, 
country-risk characteristics became drivers of bond 
issuance, while for banks from the euro area periphery 
central bank liquidity substituted for unsecured long-
term debt. We also show that heightened financial 
market tensions were detrimental to bond issuance, 
and more strongly so during crisis episodes. We find 
evidence of “leverage targeting” by means of the 
issuance of long-term debt during the crisis years. The 
positive and significant coefficient for the capital ratio 
supports the “risk absorption” hypothesis, suggesting 
that larger capital buffers enhanced the risk-bearing 
capacity of banks and allowed them to issue more 
debt. Moreover, banks with deposit supply constraints 
and relatively large loan portfolios issued more bonds, 
both before and after the crisis years. We find, too, that 
higher rated banks were more likely to issue bonds, 
also during the crisis period. Stronger banks issued 
unsecured debt in particular, while weaker banks 
resorted more to issuance of covered bonds. Overall, 
our results suggest that stronger banks – including 
those from peripheral countries – maintained better 
access to longer-term funding markets, even during 
crisis periods.
PUBLICATIONS 
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OIL PRICE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: A LONG STORY?
MARÍA DOLORES GADEA, ANA GÓMEZ-LOSCOS  
AND ANTONIO MONTAÑÉS
WORKING PAPER Nº 1625
This study investigates changes in the relationship 
between oil prices and the US economy from a long-term 
perspective. Although neither of the two series (oil price 
and GDP growth rates) presents structural breaks in 
mean, we identify different volatility periods in both of 
them, separately. From a multivariate perspective, we do 
not observe a significant effect between changes in oil 
prices and GDP growth when considering the full period. 
However, we find a significant relationship in some 
subperiods by carrying out a rolling analysis and by 
investigating the presence of structural breaks in the 
multivariate framework. Finally, we obtain evidence, by 
means of a time-varying VAR, that the impact of the oil 
price shock on GDP growth has declined over time. We 
also observe that the negative effect is greater at the time 
of large oil price increases, supporting previous evidence 
of nonlinearity in the relationship.
STOCK MARKET CYCLES AND SUPPLY SIDE DYNAMICS:  
TWO WORLDS, ONE VISION?
PAUL DE GRAUWE AND EDDIE GERBA
WORKING PAPER Nº 1626
This paper compares two state-of-the-art but very 
distinct methods used in macroeconomics: rational-
expectations DSGE and bounded rationality behavioural 
models. Both models are extended to include financial 
frictions on the supply side. The result in both 
frameworks is that production, supply of credit and the 
front payment to capital producers depend heavily on 
stock market cycles. During phases of optimism, credit 
is abundant, access to production capital is easy, the 
cash-in-advance constraint is lax, risks are undervalued, 
and production booms. But with a reversal in market 
sentiment, the contraction in all these parameters is 
deep and sometimes asymmetric. This is all the more 
evident in the behavioural model, where economic 
agents’ cognitive limitations exacerbate the contraction. 
While both models capture the empirical regularities 
very well, the validation exercise is even more 
favourable to the behavioural model.
WHEN FISCAL CONSOLIDATION MEETS PRIVATE 
DELEVERAGING
JAVIER ANDRÉS, ÓSCAR ARCE AND CARLOS THOMAS
WORKING PAPER Nº 1622
We analyze the interaction between fiscal consolidation 
and private-sector deleveraging in an economy within a 
monetary union. Pre-existing long term collateralized 
private debt – a core ingredient of the deleveraging 
process – plays a critical role in shaping fiscal multipliers. 
By buffering the short-run fall in debtors’ spending 
capacity, long-run private debt reduces the short-run 
multipliers of aggressive (large and/or fast) consolidations. 
However, absent credibility concerns, aggressive 
consolidations raise the intensity and length of private 
deleveraging, causing higher output losses over the 
medium run. In terms of discounted output losses and 
welfare, this latter effect dominates, so that larger and 
faster consolidations are relatively costlier than smaller 
and more gradual ones. Also, in this environment, 
alternative budgetary instruments generate sizable 
differences in terms of their incidence on private 
deleveraging dynamics and, hence, on the overall output 
costs of fiscal consolidations.
THE EFFECT OF ELECTORAL SYSTEMS ON VOTER TURNOUT: 
EVIDENCE FROM A NATURAL EXPERIMENT
CARLOS SANZ
WORKING PAPER Nº 1623
I exploit the unique institutional framework of Spanish 
local elections, where municipalities follow different 
electoral systems depending on their population size, 
as mandated by a national law. Using a regression 
discontinuity design, I compare turnout under closed-
list proportional representation and under an open-list, 
plurality-at-large system where voters can vote for 
individual candidates from the same or different party 
lists. I find that the openlist system increases turnout 
by between one and two percentage points. The results 
suggest that open-list systems, which introduce 
competition both across and within parties, are 
conducive to greater voter turnout.
OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY WITH HETEROGENEOUS AGENTS
GALO NUÑO AND CARLOS THOMAS
WORKING PAPER Nº 1624
See Features section.
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THE AGGREGATE EFFECTS OF GOVERNMENT INCOME 
TRANSFER SHOCKS - EU EVIDENCE
SUSANA PÁRRAGA RODRÍGUEZ
WORKING PAPER Nº 1629
This paper estimates the aggregate effect of government 
income transfer shocks for a sample of EU countries. The 
new measure of transfer shocks builds on a dataset by 
public finance experts of the European System of Central 
Banks (ESCB). The identification strategy consists of a 
narrative analysis of the old-age pension-related policy 
actions reported in the ESCB dataset. Increases in old-
age pensions are found to have a positive impact on 
aggregate expenditure components and employment 
consistent with a multiplier effect of between 0 and 1.
CREDIT, CRISIS AND CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT: EVIDENCE 
FROM THE SPANISH LOAN MARKET
JUAN S. MORA-SANGUINETTI, MARTA MARTÍNEZ-MATUTE  
AND MIGUEL GARCÍA-POSADA
WORKING PAPER Nº 1630
A number of theoretical and empirical studies have 
shown that the development of credit markets is 
affected by the efficacy of enforcement institutions. A 
less explored question is how these institutions interact 
with turns in the economic cycle and the impact of 
different types of legal procedures on credit market 
performance. This paper fills these gaps by analysing 
how differences in the availability of credit and in non-
performing loans ratios may be partially explained by 
regional variations in the quality of loan contract 
enforcement during recent periods of sustained growth 
(2001-2007) and recession (since 2008) in the Spanish 
economy. This research concludes that a rise in the 
clearance rate of executions (i.e. when a judge enforces 
the repayment of a debt) increases the ratio of total 
credit to GDP. However, the declaratory stage of 
proceedings (i.e. when a debt is first verified by a judge) 
does not seem to be statistically significant. A possible 
explanation of this finding is that, throughout the 
economic cycle, a significant proportion of the defaults 
declared are strategic (i.e. defaults by a solvent debtor). 
Furthermore, it is observed that, in regions where 
declaratory procedures are more efficient, less credit is 
declared as non-performing. The latter effect, however, 
is only observed after the onset of the “Great Recession” 
in 2008. This may be related to the increase in non-
strategic defaults during a downturn. 
THE EVOLUTION OF INFLATION EXPECTATIONS IN EURO  
AREA MARKETS
RICARDO GIMENO AND EVA ORTEGA
WORKING PAPER Nº 1627
This paper explores the behaviour of inflation 
expectations across countries that share their monetary 
policy, in particular those of the European Monetary 
Union. We investigate the possible common features at 
the various horizons, as well as differentials across 
euro area countries. A multi-country dynamic factor 
model based on Diebold et al. (2008), where we also 
add a liquidity risk component, is proposed and 
estimated using daily data from inflation swaps for 
Spain, Italy, France, Germany and the euro area as a 
whole, and for a wide range of horizons. It allows us to 
calculate the proportion of common vs country-specific 
components in the term structure of inflation 
expectations. We find sizable differences in inflation 
expectations across the main euro area countries only 
at short maturities, while in general a common 
component predominates throughout the years, 
especially at long horizons. The common long-run level 
of inflation expectations is estimated to have fallen 
since late 2014, while an increased persistence of 
lower expected inflation and for longer horizons is 
estimated from 2012. There has been no reversal in 
either of these characteristics following the 
announcement and implementation of the ECB’s 
unconventional monetary policy measures.
THE DYNAMIC EFFECT OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURE SHOCKS  
IN THE UNITED STATES
SUSANA PÁRRAGA RODRÍGUEZ
WORKING PAPER Nº 1628
This paper estimates the dynamic aggregate effect of 
exogenous shocks to two key components of public 
expenditure in the United States: government income 
transfers and government spending. The identification 
strategy positions the structural shocks to public 
expenditures in an SVAR framework with exogenous 
measures of public expenditure changes. Transfers 
shocks are based on a new narrative variable of 
legislated increases in U.S. social security benefits. I 
demonstrate that shocks to different types of public 
expenditure do not have the same macroeconomic 
impact. The estimated government spending multiplier 
is between 0 and 1, while increases in transfers 
generate a multiplier effect above 1.
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EDUCATION, LABOUR MARKET EXPERIENCE AND COGNITIVE 
SKILLS: EVIDENCE FROM PIAAC
JUAN FRANCISCO JIMENO, AITOR LACUESTA,  
MARTA MARTÍNEZ-MATUTE AND ERNESTO VILLANUEVA
WORKING PAPER Nº 1635
See Features section.
IMPLICIT PUBLIC DEBT THRESHOLDS: AN EMPIRICAL 
EXERCISE FOR THE CASE OF SPAIN
JAVIER ANDRÉS, JAVIER J. PÉREZ AND JUAN A. ROJAS
WORKING PAPER Nº 1701
We extend previous work that combines the Value at 
Risk approach with estimation of the correlation 
pattern of the macroeconomic determinants of public 
debt dynamics by means of Vector Autoregressions 
(VARs). These estimated models are used to compute 
the probability that the public debt ratio exceeds a 
given threshold, by means of Monte Carlo simulations. 
We apply this methodology to Spanish data and 
compute time-series probabilities to analyse the 
possible correlation with market risk assessment, 
measured by the spread over the German bond. Taking 
into account the high correlation between the 
probability of crossing a pre-specified debt threshold 
and the spread, we go a step further and ask what 
would be the threshold that maximises the correlation 
between the two variables. The aim of this exercise is 
to gauge the implicit debt threshold or “prudent debt 
level” that is most consistent with market expectations 
as measured by the sovereign yield spread. The level 
thus obtained is consistent with the medium-term 
debt-to-GDP ratio anchor of 60% of GDP.
BUSINESS CYCLE ESTIMATION WITH HIGH-PASS  
AND BAND-PASS LOCAL POLYNOMIAL REGRESSION
LUIS J. ÁLVAREZ
WORKING PAPER Nº 1702
Filters constructed on the basis of standard local 
polynomial regression (LPR) methods have been used 
in the literature to estimate the business cycle. We 
provide a frequency domain interpretation of the 
contrast filter obtained by the difference between a 
series and its long-run LPR component and show that 
it operates as a kind of high-pass filter, meaning it 
provides a noisy estimate of the cycle. We alternatively 
propose band-pass local polynomial regression 
methods aimed at isolating the cyclical component. 
Results are compared to standard high-pass and 
band-pass filters. Procedures are illustrated using the 
US GDP series.
UNCOVERING THE HETEROGENEOUS EFFECTS OF ECB 
UNCONVENTIONAL MONETARY POLICIES ACROSS EURO AREA 
COUNTRIES
PABLO BURRIEL AND ALESSANDRO GALESI
WORKING PAPER Nº 1631
See Features section. 
ON THE DETERMINANTS OF FISCAL NON-COMPLIANCE:  
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF SPAIN’S REGIONS
MAR DELGADO TÉLLEZ, VÍCTOR D. LLEDÓ AND JAVIER J. PÉREZ
WORKING PAPER Nº 1632
See Features section.
PORTFOLIO REBALANCING AND ASSET PRICING WITH 
HETEROGENEOUS INATTENTION
OMAR RACHEDI
WORKING PAPER Nº 1633
Can households’ inattention to the stock market 
quantitatively account for the inertia in portfolio 
rebalancing? I address this question by introducing an 
observation cost into a production economy with 
heterogeneous agents. In this environment inattention 
changes endogenously over time and across agents. I 
find that inattention explains the inertia in portfolio 
rebalancing and its heterogeneity across households. 
Inattention also rationalises the limited stock market 
participation observed in the data, and improves the 
asset pricing performance of the model. Finally, I 
present a novel testable implication linking the effects 
of inattention on portfolio choices and asset prices to 
households’ funding liquidity.
THE VARIATION OF EXPORT PRICES ACROSS AND WITHIN FIRMS
JUAN DE LUCIO, RAÚL MÍNGUEZ, ASIER MINONDO  
AND FRANCISCO REQUENA 
WORKING PAPER Nº 1634
This paper uses transaction-level trade data to analyse 
the differences in export prices across and within Spanish 
manufacturing firms in the year 2014. The transactional 
nature of the database uncovers sizable differences in 
the price that an exporter charges for the same product 
and destination. These differences are related to the 
number of goods covered within each product category, 
volume discounts and vertically differentiated varieties. 
Export prices are positively correlated with firms’ 
productivity, destination markets’ GDP per capita and 
distance to Spain. These latter results suggest that 
Spanish exporters compete in quality.
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likely it is to form an association to obtain credit, and 
we show that associations comprising small firms with 
no credit history are especially credit constrained.
THE EVOLUTION OF REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTERLINKAGES  
IN EUROPE
MARÍA DOLORES GADEA-RIVAS, ANA GÓMEZ-LOSCOS  
AND DANILO LEIVA-LEON
WORKING PAPER Nº 1705
This paper studies the dynamics of the propagation of 
regional business cycle shocks in Europe and uncovers 
new features of its underlying mechanisms. To address 
the lack of high frequency data at the regional level, we 
propose a new method to measure timevarying 
synchronization in small samples that combines 
regime-switching models and dynamic model 
averaging. The results indicate that: (i) in just two years, 
the Great Recession synchronized Europe twice as 
much as the European Union integration process did 
over several decades; (ii) Ile de France is the region 
acting as the main channel for the transmission of 
business cycle shocks in Europe; followed by Inner 
London and Lombardia; and (iii) we identify a nonlinear 
relationship between sectoral composition and regional 
synchronization, which was amplified in the wake of 
the Great Recession. Similarities in services sectors are 
primarily responsible for this nonlinear relationship.
THE CRUCIAL ROLE OF SOCIAL WELFARE CRITERIA FOR 
OPTIMAL INHERITANCE TAXATION
ESTEBAN GARCÍA-MIRALLES
WORKING PAPER Nº 1706
This paper calibrates the full social optimal inheritance 
tax rate derived by Piketty and Saez (2013) and shows 
that different assumptions on the form of the social 
welfare function lead to very different optimal 
inheritance tax rates, ranging from negative (under a 
utilitarian criterion) to positive and large (even assuming 
joy of giving motives). The paper also calibrates the 
optimal tax rate by percentile of the distribution of 
bequest received, as Piketty and Saez do, but 
accounting for heterogeneity in wealth and labor 
income. The result is that the optimal tax rate from the 
perspective of the non-receivers varies significantly, 
contrary to the constant tax rate obtained by these 
authors.
DYNAMIC PANEL DATA MODELLING USING MAXIMUM 
LIKELIHOOD: AN ALTERNATIVE TO ARELLANO-BOND
ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO, PAUL ALLISON AND RICHARD WILLIAMS
WORKING PAPER Nº 1703
The Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator is widely-used 
among applied researchers when estimating dynamic 
panels with fixed effects and predetermined regressors. 
This estimator might behave poorly in finite samples 
when the cross-section dimension of the data is small 
(i.e. small N), especially if the variables under analysis 
are persistent over time. This paper discusses a 
maximum likelihood estimator that is asymptotically 
equivalent to Arellano and Bond (1991) but presents 
better finite sample behaviour. Moreover, the estimator 
is easy to implement in Stata using the xtdpdml 
command as described in the companion paper 
Williams et al. (2016), which also discusses further 
advantages of the proposed estimator for practitioners.
CREATING ASSOCIATIONS AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR DIRECT 
BANK CREDIT. EVIDENCE FROM BELGIUM
MIKEL BEDAYO
WORKING PAPER Nº 1704
Firms’ incentives to join up with other firms to apply 
collectively for a single loan are studied empirically in 
this paper. When several firms make a joint application 
for a single loan an association of firms is created. We 
identify the associations that had access to credit in 
Belgium over the period 2001-2011 and the firms that 
made up each association, observing the amount of 
credit that both the firms and the associations obtained 
from each financial institution they used. We analyse 
the amount of credit obtained by firms according to 
whether or not they belonged to an association, the 
likelihood of firms forming associations, the impact of 
belonging to an association on the amount of credit 
firms receive from banks and the effect of firms not 
obtaining any direct credit on the amount obtained by 
the associations formed by such firms. We also analyse 
whether associations formed by common-ownership 
firms are able to access more credit than other 
associations. We find that large and long-established 
firms are more likely to join up with other firms to make 
joint loan applications and that associations obtain 
more credit if all their members use the same bank as 
the association does to obtain credit. Furthermore, the 
lower a firm’s credit over the previous year, the more 
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population. Regression discontinuity estimates indicate 
that direct democracy leads to smaller government, 
reducing public spending by around 8%. Public 
revenue decreases by a similar amount and, therefore, 
there is no effect on budget deficits. These findings can 
be explained by a model in which direct democracy 
allows voters to enforce lower special interest spending.
FISCAL DELEGATION IN A MONETARY UNION:  
INSTRUMENT ASSIGNMENT AND STABILIZATION PROPERTIES
HENRIQUE S. BASSO AND JAMES COSTAIN
WORKING PAPER Nº 1710
Motivated by the failure of fiscal rules to eliminate 
deficit bias in the euro area, this paper analyzes an 
alternative policy regime in which each Member State 
government delegates at least one fiscal instrument to 
an independent authority with a mandate to avoid 
excessive debt. Other fiscal decisions remain in the 
hands of member governments, including the allocation 
of spending across different public goods, and the 
composition of taxation. We study the short - and long-
run properties of dynamic games representing different 
institutional configurations in a monetary union. 
Delegation of budget balance responsibilities to a 
national or union-wide fiscal authority implies large 
long-run welfare gains due to much lower steady-state 
debt. The presence of the fiscal authority also reduces 
the welfare cost of fluctuations in the demand for public 
spending, in spite of the fact that the authority imposes 
considerable “austerity” when it responds to fiscal 
shocks.
TFP GROWTH AND COMMODITY PRICES IN EMERGING 
ECONOMIES
IVÁN KATARYNIUK AND JAIME MARTÍNEZ-MARTÍN
WORKING PAPER Nº 1711
In this paper we aim at empirically testing cross-country 
impacts of commodity price shocks to aggregate TFP 
growth for a sample of emerging economies. Under a 
growth accounting framework, we estimate country-
specific TFP growth (1992-2014) and select the 
attendant robust determinants by means of a Bayesian 
Model Averaging (BMA) approach. To identify the 
effects of structural shocks, we propose a Bayesian 
panel VAR model and calculate cyclically adjusted TFP 
growth net of demand shocks (i.e. output gap) and 
commodity prices. Our results suggest that: i) the 
relationship of commodity prices to TFP growth has 
been very high in small commodity-exporting 
economies (i.e. an increase of 10% in commodity 
prices is associated with a sizable expansion of TFP 
SERVICE REGULATIONS, INPUT PRICES AND EXPORT 
VOLUMES: EVIDENCE FROM A PANEL OF MANUFACTURING 
FIRMS
MÓNICA CORREA-LÓPEZ AND RAFAEL DOMÉNECH
WORKING PAPER Nº 1707
Using a panel of firm-level data from Spanish 
manufacturers, this study shows that better service 
regulation reduces the price of intermediate inputs paid 
by downstream firms. The beneficial cost effects of 
services reforms extend to both large and small-to-
medium sized corporations (SMEs), but the former 
tend to enjoy greater gains. This feature also manifests 
itself in international markets. We identify an input cost 
channel through which service regulations affect the 
volume of exports of large manufacturers, while the 
evidence of such channel is weaker for SMEs. Our 
estimates indicate that, from 1991 till 2007, large firms 
increased their volume of exports by an average of 
22% as a result of the direct input cost effect of services 
reforms, such that the firms that benefited the most 
typically belonged to industries more dependent on 
service inputs. Furthermore, convergence to the “best 
practice” regulatory framework in services would have 
raised exports at least by an additional 10%. We 
conclude that firm size is relevant for the connection 
between services reforms, intermediate input prices 
and export volumes.
DISSECTING US RECOVERIES
MARÍA DOLORES GADEA, ANA GÓMEZ-LOSCOS  
AND GABRIEL PÉREZ-QUIRÓS
WORKING PAPER Nº 1708
We propose a set of new quantitative measures to 
characterise more fully the features of economic 
recoveries. We apply these measures to post-war US 
expansions and use cluster analysis to determine that 
there are two different types of recoveries in recent US 
economic history, with most expansions before 1984 
(Great Moderation) looking quite different from those 
after.
DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNMENT SIZE:  
EVIDENCE FROM SPAIN
CARLOS SANZ
WORKING PAPER Nº 1709
Direct democracy is spreading across the world, but 
little is known about its effects on policy. I provide 
evidence from a unique scenario. In Spain, national law 
determines that municipalities follow either direct or 
representative democracy, depending on their 
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attached a positive weight to real house price growth 
but lowered it prior to the crisis and eventually raised it 
again, and ii) only episodically took real stock price 
growth into account.
THE IMPACT OF FIRMS’ FINANCIAL POSITION ON FIXED 
INVESTMENT AND EMPLOYMENT. AN ANALYSIS FOR SPAIN
FÁTIMA HERRANZ GONZÁLEZ AND CARMEN MARTÍNEZ-CARRASCAL
WORKING PAPER Nº 1714
Using a large sample of Spanish companies, this paper 
investigates the impact that firms’ financial health has 
on their investment and employment decisions. The 
results indicate that firms’ financial position is important 
for explaining firms’ capital expenditures and their 
employment levels, since cash flow, indebtedness and 
the debt burden appear to be relevant for explaining 
investment and employment dynamics. Likewise, the 
results obtained point to a non-linear impact of financial 
position on these decisions, this being larger for 
companies in a less sound financial situation, and 
suggest that the role of financial factors in explaining 
investment and employment dynamics is likely to be 
greater in recessionary periods. 
FINANCIAL STABILITY JOURNAL
The Financial Stability Journal (Revista de Estabilidad 
Financiera) is a half-yearly journal published by the 
Banco de España that aims to act as a platform for 
communication and dialogue regarding issues related 
to financial stability, with a particular focus on prudential 
regulation and supervision. Its board of editors 
comprises internal and external professionals. All 
articles appearing in the journal, which may be authored 
by Banco de España staff or researchers from other 
institutions, are refereed by at least one member of the 
board of editors.
LA REGULACIÓN DE LOS ÍNDICES DE REFERENCIA  
Y LA REFORMA DEL EURÍBOR
MARÍA JOSÉ GÓMEZ YUBERO 
ESTABILIDAD FINANCIERA 31, NOVEMBER 2016, 9-26
This paper reviews the main measures adopted by the 
international authorities in response to the G20’s 
mandate to strengthen benchmark indices (such as 
LIBOR, EURIBOR and TIBOR) and to reduce the 
possibilities of manipulation. The author specifically 
focuses on the European Regulation on Indices used 
growth in a year for an average commodity exporter); ii) 
although our evidence is not sufficient to empirically 
distinguish among theoretical explanations, our results 
favour an interpretation that weights short-term effects 
of commodity prices on productivity, either through 
transitional dynamics to the manufacturing sector or 
through mismeasurement of TFP; and iii) cyclically 
adjusted TFP growth highlights the importance of 
negative supply shocks in commodity-exporting 
countries. All in all, much of the increase in TFP growth 
in the last decade was related to a favourable cyclical 
environment, a result with potentially significant policy 
implications for commodity-dependent economies.
TOP-DOWN VS. BOTTOM-UP? RECONCILING THE EFFECTS  
OF TAX AND TRANSFER SHOCKS ON OUTPUT
SEBASTIAN GECHERT, CHRISTOPH PAETZ
AND PALOMA VILLANUEVA
WORKING PAPER Nº 1712
Using the bottom-up approach of Romer and Romer 
(2010), we construct a narrative dataset of net-revenue 
shocks for Germany by extending the tax shock series 
of Hayo and Uhl (2014) and coding a shock series for 
social security contributions, benefits and transfers. 
We estimate the multiplier effects of shocks to net 
revenues, taxes, social security contributions, benefits 
and transfers in a proxy SVAR framework [Mertens and 
Ravn (2013)] and compare them with the top-down 
identification [Blanchard and Perotti (2002)]. We find 
multiplier effects of net-revenue components between 
0 and 1 for both approaches. These estimates are 
comparably low and we investigate the differences.
HAS THE FED RESPONDED TO HOUSE AND STOCK PRICES?  
A TIME-VARYING ANALYSIS
KNUT ARE AASTVEIT, FRANCESCO FURLANETTO
AND FRANCESCA LORIA
WORKING PAPER Nº 1713
In this paper we use a structural VAR model with time-
varying parameters and stochastic volatility to 
investigate whether the Federal Reserve has responded 
systematically to asset prices and whether this 
response has changed over time. To recover the 
systematic component of monetary policy, we interpret 
the interest rate equation in the VAR as an extended 
monetary policy rule responding to inflation, the output 
gap, house prices and stock prices. We find some time 
variation in the coefficients for house prices and stock 
prices but fairly stable coefficients over time for inflation 
and the output gap. Our results indicate that the 
systematic component of monetary policy in the US, i) 
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THE NET STABLE FUNDING RATIO: THEORETICAL 
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS OF THE SPANISH BANKING 
SECTOR
ITZIAR IRANZO MARCO 
ESTABILIDAD FINANCIERA 31, NOVEMBER 2016, 63-96
This paper proposes a methodology for calculating the 
net stable funding ratio (NSFR) and estimates, on this 
basis, the level of this ratio for the main Spanish banks 
in 2013 and 2015. The results show the gradual 
increase in the estimated average liquidity ratio across 
the banks surveyed, from 95% in 2013 to 106% in 
2015. In addition, the article shows the analysis of the 
specific balance sheet rearrangement measures aimed 
at enhancing the ratio, focusing particularly on those 
affecting credit supply and the volume of deposits. 
While a disparity of reallocation methods across banks 
is observed, the article concludes that adjustment 
towards the NSFR does not necessarily entail a 
reduction in lending or increased deposits. 
RECENT PUBLICATIONS  
IN REFEREED JOURNALS
COUNTRY SHOCKS, MONETARY POLICY EXPECTATIONS  
AND ECB DECISIONS. A DYNAMIC NON-LINEAR APPROACH
M. CAMACHO, D. LEIVA LEÓN AND G. PÉREZ QUIRÓS 
ADVANCES IN ECONOMETRICS, 
35, 2016, 283-316
MEASURING BANK COMPETITION UNDER BINDING INTEREST 
RATE REGULATION: THE CASE OF CHINA
B. XU, A. VAN RIXTEL AND M. VAN LEUVENSTEIJN
APPLIED ECONOMICS, 
48 (49), APRIL 2016, 4699-4718
ON THE PREDICTABILITY OF NARRATIVE FISCAL 
ADJUSTMENTS
P. HERNÁNDEZ DE COS AND E. MORAL-BENITO
ECONOMICS LETTERS, 
143, JUNE 2016, 69-72
AGGREGATE VERSUS DISAGGREGATE INFORMATION  
IN DYNAMIC FACTOR MODELS
R. ALVAREZ, M. CAMACHO AND G. PÉREZ QUIRÓS 
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF FORECASTING, 
32 (3), JULY–SEPTEMBER 2016, 680–694
as Benchmarks, which was recently approved with the 
aim of ensuring that the indices produced and used in 
the European Union are reliable, representative, suited 
to purpose and not prone to manipulation. The 
regulation clarifies the responsibilities that may arise 
from the production of indices and subjects this activity 
to supervision, along with the institutions involved. The 
critical indices, such as EURIBOR, are subject to 
stricter rules. The article concludes setting out the 
status of the EURIBOR reform under way and the 
challenges outstanding. 
MACROPRUDENTIAL THEORY: ADVANCES AND CHALLENGES
HENRIQUE S. BASSO AND JAMES S. COSTAIN
ESTABILIDAD FINANCIERA 31, NOVEMBER 2016, 27-42
The authors review the academic literature on 
macroprudential policies, including recent theoretical 
work analysing the causes of financial instability, its 
consequences for the macroeconomy and the potential 
macroprudential response to these causes and 
consequences. The article focuses on the information 
asymmetries under which transactions occur in 
banking and financial markets in general, and on the 
strategic complementarities between the decisions of 
agents operating on different markets, as underlying 
elements common to the causes and consequences of 
financial fragility. To conclude, the current challenges 
for macroeconomic modelling and for the design of 
regulation and public policy in the macroprudential 
field are discussed.
RIESGO DE LIQUIDEZ SISTÉMICA. INDICADORES PARA  
EL SISTEMA BANCARIO ESPAÑOL
MATÍAS LAMAS RODRÍGUEZ 
ESTABILIDAD FINANCIERA 31, NOVEMBER 2016, 43-62
The author proposes a non-exhaustive list of indicators 
proxying the exposure of the Spanish banking system 
to systemic liquidity risk, understood as institutions’ 
underestimation of the possibility of not being able to 
obtain funding on the markets or to dispose of a 
sufficient volume of liquid assets at a fair price. The 
indicators consider two key elements: aspects of the 
banks’ balance sheets related to the stability of their 
funding sources and to their buffers of liquid financial 
assets (funding liquidity risk), and the actual liquidity 
that Treasury debt can provide as part of the buffer of 
liquid assets (market liquidity risk). The article concludes 
that there is fairly sound evidence that bank balance 
sheets have gained “liquidity” in recent years, while the 
results of the analysis of market liquidity are still rather 
inconclusive.
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OPORTUNIDADES PARA LA ECONOMÍA ESPAÑOLA  
DEL ACUERDO TTIP ENTRE LA UE Y EEUU
E. GORDO AND D. MARTÍNEZ TURÉGANO 
PAPELES DE ECONOMÍA ESPAÑOLA, 
150, DECEMBER 2016, 51-68
MODELING INTEREST PAYMENTS FOR MACROECONOMIC 
ASSESSMENT
C. GIRÓN, E. QUILIS, D. SANTABÁRBARA AND C. TORREGROSA
EURONA, EUROSTAT REVIEW OF NATIONAL ACCOUNTS AND 
MACROECONOMIC INDICATORS, 
2/2016, JANUARY 2017, 7-28
BUSINESS CYCLE ESTIMATION WITH HIGH-PASS  
AND BAND-PASS LOCAL POLYNOMIAL REGRESSION
L. J. ÁLVAREZ
ECONOMETRICS, MDPI, OPEN ACCESS JOURNAL 
5(1), MARCH 2017,1
LAS REFORMAS DE LA LEY CONCURSAL  
DURANTE LA GRAN RECESIÓN
M. GARCÍA-POSADA AND R. VEGAS
PAPELES DE ECONOMÍA ESPAÑOLA 
151, MARCH 2017, 140-171
UN ANÁLISIS ECONÓMICO DE LA JURISDICCIÓN 
CONTENCIOSO-ADMINISTRATIVA: EL EFECTO DEL NUEVO 
CRITERIO DE COSTAS Y LAS TASAS JUDICIALES
J. S. MORA-SANGUINETTI AND M. MARTÍNEZ-MATUTE
PAPELES DE ECONOMÍA ESPAÑOLA 
151, MARCH 2017, 88-101
EL ANÁLISIS DEL CICLO ECONÓMICO EN EUROPA:  
LA EXISTENCIA DE UN SOLO CLUSTER
M D. GADEA, A. GÓMEZ LOSCOS AND E. BANDRÉS
CUADERNOS DE INFORMACIÓN ECONÓMICA 
257, MARCH/APRIL 2017, 77-93
BANK LEVERAGE CYCLES
G. NUÑO AND C. THOMAS
AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL: MACROECONOMICS,  
9 (2), APRIL 2017, 32-72
DISSECTING US RECOVERIES
M. D. GADEA, A GOMEZ LOSCOS AND G. PÉREZ QUIRÓS
ECONOMICS LETTERS 
154, MAY 2017, 59-63
THE PUBLIC SECTOR WAGE PREMIUM IN SPAIN:  
EVIDENCE FROM LONGITUDINAL ADMINISTRATIVE DATA
L. HOSPIDO AND E. MORAL-BENITO 
LABOUR ECONOMICS, 
42, OCTOBER 2016, 101-122
OIL PRICE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: A LONG STORY?
M. D. GADEA, A. GÓMEZ-LOSCOS AND A. MONTAÑÉS
ECONOMETRICS, MDPI, OPEN ACCESS JOURNAL, 
4 (4), OCTOBER 2016, 41
SOVEREIGN RATINGS AND THEIR ASYMMETRIC RESPONSE  
TO FUNDAMENTALS
C. BROTO AND L. MOLINA
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR AND ORGANIZATION, 
130, OCTOBER 2016, 206–224
THE IMPACT OF THE 2011 SHORT-SALE BAN ON FINANCIAL 
STABILITY: EVIDENCE FROM THE SPANISH STOCK MARKET
O. ARCE AND S. MAYORDOMO
EUROPEAN FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, 
22 (5), NOVEMBER 2016, 1001-1022
JUST ONE BUSINESS CYCLE IN EUROPE
M. D. GADEA, A. GÓMEZ-LOSCOS AND E. BANDRÉS
SPANISH ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL OUTLOOK, 
5 (6), NOVEMBER 2016, 79-92
LA COBERTURA DE LA NEGOCIACIÓN COLECTIVA EN ESPAÑA. 
UNA PROPUESTA DE MEDICIÓN
M. MARTÍNEZ-MATUTE
REVISTA DE ECONOMÍA LABORAL, 
13 (2), NOVEMBER 2016, 34-64
LA RIGIDEZ DEL COSTE LABORAL Y EL CRECIMIENTO 
DEL EMPLEO EN ESPAÑA
M. MARTÍNEZ-MATUTE
REVISTA DE ECONOMÍA LABORAL, 
13 (2), NOVEMBER 2016, 135-155
FROM BISMARCK TO BEVERIDGE: THE OTHER PENSION 
REFORM IN SPAIN
J. I. CONDE-RUIZ AND C. I. GONZÁLEZ
SERIES, JOURNAL OF THE SPANISH ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION, 
7 (4), NOVEMBER 2016, 461–490
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MONETARY TRANSMISSION UNDER COMPETING CORPORATE 
FINANCE REGIMES
P. DE GRAUWE AND E. GERBA
ENSAYOS SOBRE POLÍTICA ECONÓMICA 
THE MACROECONOMIC IMPACT OF DELAYED GOVERNMENT 
PAYMENTS: A CASE STUDY
P. HERNÁNDEZ DE COS, S. HURTADO, M. DELGADO-TÉLLEZ  
AND J. J. PÉREZ
PUBLIC FINANCE AND MANAGEMENT
A QUARTERLY FISCAL DATABASE FIT FOR MACROECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS
F. DE CASTRO, F. MARTÍ, A. MONTESINOS, J. J. PÉREZ AND A. J. 
SÁNCHEZ
HACIENDA PÚBLICA ESPAÑOLA - REVIEW OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
FORTHCOMING ARTICLES  
IN REFEREED JOURNALS
MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY, COUNTERCYCLICAL BANK 
CAPITAL BUFFERS AND CREDIT SUPPLY: EVIDENCE FROM  
THE SPANISH DYNAMIC PROVISIONING EXPERIMENTS
G. JIMÉNEZ, S. ONGENA, J. L. PEYDRÓ AND J. SAURINA
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
VOLATILITY-RELATED EXCHANGE TRADED ASSETS:  
AN ECONOMETRIC INVESTIGATION
J. MENCÍA AND E. SENTANA
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC STATISTICS
THE IMPACT OF THE IRB APPROACH ON THE RISK WEIGHTS  
OF EUROPEAN BANKS
C. PÉREZ MONTES, C. TRUCHARTE ARTIGAS, M. E. CRISTÓFOLI AND 
N. LAVÍN SAN SEGUNDO
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL STABILITY
WHEN DOES RELATIONSHIP LENDING START TO PAY?
S. MAYORDOMO, G. LÓPEZ-ESPINOSA AND A. MORENO
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION
DISENTANGLING THE EFFECTS OF HOUSEHOLD FINANCIAL 
CONSTRAINTS AND RISK PROFILE ON MORTGAGE RATES
S. MAYORDOMO, S. CARBÓ-VALVERDE  
AND F. RODRÍGUEZ-FERNÁNDEZ
JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE FINANCE AND ECONOMICS
THE CYCLE OF EARNINGS INEQUALITY: EVIDENCE FROM 
SPANISH SOCIAL SECURITY DATA
S. BONHOMME AND L. HOSPIDO
ECONOMIC JOURNAL
CREDIT, CRISIS AND CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT:  
EVIDENCE FROM THE SPANISH LOAN MARKET
J. S. MORA-SANGUINETTI, M. MARTÍNEZ-MATUTE  
AND M. GARCÍA-POSADA
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS
PORTFOLIO REBALANCING AND ASSET PRICING WITH 
HETEROGENEOUS INATTENTION
O. RACHEDI
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
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NEWS
NEW OCCASIONAL VISITING SCHOLAR PROGRAM
The ADG Economics and Research has recently 
launched an Occasional Visiting Scholar Program 
aimed at maintaining a high standard of achievement in 
the research output of the Banco de España. The 
program brings distinguished scholars for a few one-
week stays, in order to advise on specific projects of 
the research staff. This year the Banco de España will 
host the following scholars:
Pol Antràs (Harvard University).
Jesús Fernández-Villaverde (University of Pennsylvania).
Tano Santos (Columbia University).
BANCO DE ESPAÑA ECONOMISTS APPOINTED TO COORDINATE 
ESCB RESEARCH CLUSTERS
The ECB and the national central banks of the European 
Union, which together make up the European System 
of Central Banks (ESCB), have recently established 
three Research Clusters to promote collaborative work 
across ESCB institutions. 
The Banco de España is pleased to announce that two 
of its staff will be involved in organizing these networks. 
Research Cluster 1, to address monetary economics, 
will be coordinated by Carlos Thomas (Banco de 
España) and Alessandro Secchi (Banca d’Italia). 
Research Cluster 2, which will address macroeconomic 
policy issues related to the context of a monetary 
union, including international macroeconomics, fiscal 
policy, labor economics, competitiveness, and EMU 
governance, will be coordinated by James Costain 
(Banco de España) and Antoine Berthou (Banque de 
France). Research Cluster 3, addressing financial 
economics, will be coordinated by Hiona Balfoussia 
(Bank of Greece) and David Marqués (ECB). 
This year, the Banco de España will host the Annual 
Workshops of Clusters 1 and 2 in October and 
November, respectively. For further details, see the 
ANNOUNCEMENTS section.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA ECONOMIST APPOINTED TO CO-CHAIR 
EUROSYSTEM WORKING GROUP ON ECONOMETRIC MODELLING 
The Working Group on Econometric Modelling (WGEM) 
is one of the three substructures assisting the Monetary 
Policy Committee (MPC) of the Eurosystem, along with 
the Working Group on Forecasting and the Working 
Group on Public Finances. 
The WGEM gathers macroeconomic modelers of the 
ECB and the national central banks of the European 
Union. The WGEM has a double mandate in its role of 
assisting the MPC. On the one hand, it aims at 
promoting improvements in the macro-econometric 
modelling toolkit to meet the needs of the Eurosystem, 
and for that purpose it is a key forum for fostering 
model development and sharing related information 
across its members. On the other hand, the WGEM 
assesses analytical and technical issues of interest to 
the MPC through specific reports elaborated by 
dedicated teams, several of which have been published 
as ECB Working Papers or Occasional Papers. 
Traditionally chaired by ECB staff from DG-Research 
only, the chairmanship of the WGEM has been opened 
to national central banks for the first time. The newly-
appointed co-chairs are Matteo Ciccarelli (Senior 
Adviser, ECB DG-Research) and Eva Ortega (Head of 
the Modelling Unit in the Modelling and Macro Analysis 
Division, Banco de España).
NEWS AND EVENTS
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RECENT ECONOMIC RESEARCH 
SEMINARS
LINK TO SEMINARS PAGE
FINANCIAL AND FISCAL SHOCKS IN THE GREAT RECESSION 
AND RECOVERY OF THE SPANISH ECONOMY
RAFAEL DOMENECH 
BBVA RESEARCH, 
9 SEPT. 2016
BANKS, LIQUIDITY MANAGEMENT AND MONETARY POLICY
SAKI BIGIO 
UNIV. OF CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES, 
14 SEPT. 2016 
MONETARY POLICY FOR A BUBBLY WORLD
ALBERTO MARTIN 
CREI, UNIV. POMPEU FABRA, 
21 SEPT. 2016
THE EFFECTS OF A MONEY-FINANCED FISCAL STIMULUS
JORDI GALÍ 
CREI, UNIV. POMPEU FABRA, 
27 SEPT. 2016
REALLOCATION OF INTANGIBLE CAPITAL AND SECULAR 
STAGNATION
ANDREA CAGGESE 
UNIV. POMPEU FABRA, 
19 OCT. 2016
LABOR MARKET IMPLICATIONS OF UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFIT 
EXTENSIONS
KURT MITMAN 
INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC STUDIES, 
26 OCT. 2016
INFLATION, DEFAULT AND THE DENOMINATION OF SOVEREIGN 
DEBT
LAURA SUNDER-PLASMAN 
UNIV. OF COPENHAGEN, 
2 NOV. 2016
RECENT CONFERENCES
LINK TO CONFERENCES PAGE
SECOND JOINT RESEARCH WORKSHOP
MADRID, 18 APRIL 2017 
On the morning of April 18, 2017, the Banco de España 
and the Centro de Estudios Monetarios y Financieros 
(CEMFI) celebrated their second Joint Research 
Workshop. Two economists from each institution 
presented their recent research to an audience drawn 
from the two institutions and from the local economics 
community. The speakers on this occasion were Joan 
Monras and Paula Bustos of CEMFI, and Mario Alloza 
and Dominik Thaler of the Banco de España. The two 
institutions anticipate that workshops of this type will be 
repeated regularly in the future, in order to strengthen 
ties and promote joint research projects.
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RESOLUTION OF COLLATERAL CRISES
MARTIN GONZALEZ-EIRAS 
UNIVERSITY OF COPENHAGEN, 
22 FEB. 2017
CHANGES IN THE COST OF BANK EQUITY AND THE SUPPLY  
OF BANK CREDIT
STEVEN ONGENA 
UNIVERSITY OF ZURICH, 
27 FEB. 2017
LOCAL LABOR MARKET EFFECTS OF PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT
JOSE SILVA 
UNIVERSITAT DE GIRONA, 
1 MARCH 2017
MEASURING RISK SHARING IN EUROPE AND CHARACTERIZING 
COUNTRY HETEROGENEITY
PILAR PONCELA 
JOINT RESEARCH CENTRE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 
6 MARCH 2017
DEMAND AND SUPPLY OF POPULISM
HELIOS HERRERA 
WARWICK UNIVERSITY, 
13 MARCH 2017
A THEORY OF COLLATERAL FOR THE LENDER OF LAST RESORT
TANJU YORULMAZER 
UNIV. OF AMSTERDAM, 
15 MARCH 2017
THE COLLAPSE OF THE LIBERAL ORDER
MANUEL MUÑIZ 
IE SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND HARVARD 
UNIVERSITY, 
21 MARCH 2017
THE BLACK-WHITE GAP IN EARNINGS AND EMPLOYMENT
ARNAU VALLADARES-ESTEBAN 
UNIV. OF SOUTHAMPTON, 
22 MARCH 2017
OPTIMAL AUTOMATIC STABILIZERS
ALISDAIR MCKAY  
BOSTON UNIVERSITY, 
29 MARCH 2017
AMBIGUOUS POLICY ANNOUNCEMENTS
CLAUDIO MICHELACCI  
EINAUDI INSTITUTE,  
3 NOV. 2016
IMF FISCAL MONITOR
MARIALUZ MORENO BADIA 
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, 
8 NOV. 2016
ON THE DOUBLE TAXATION OF PROFITS
ALEXIS ANAGNOSTOPOULOS 
STONY BROOK UNIVERSITY 
10 NOV. 2016
KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS WITHOUT THE PHILLIPS CURVE
ROGER FARMER 
UNIV. OF WARWICK, 
16 NOV. 2016
FINANCIAL LITERACY EXTERNALITIES
MICHAEL HALIASSOS 
GOETHE UNIVERSITY FRANKFURT, 
23 NOV. 2016
WORKSHOP IN APPLIED FINANCIAL MACROECONOMICS
MARCO LOMBARDI 
BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS,  
SIMON VAN NORDEN  
HEC MONTREAL, 
12 DEC. 2016
ARE THE SPANISH LONG-TERM UNEMPLOYED 
UNEMPLOYABLE?
JOSE IGNACIO GARCIA PEREZ 
UNIV. PABLO DE OLAVIDE, 
19 DEC. 2016
POLITICAL DISTRIBUTION RISK AND BUSINESS CYCLES
JESUS FERNANDEZ-VILLAVERDE 
UNIV. OF PENNSYLVANIA, 
22 DEC. 2016
MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS OF OFFICIAL DEBT 
RESTRUCTURING: EVIDENCE FROM THE PARIS CLUB
AITOR ERCE 
EUROPEAN STABILITY MECHANISM, 
17 FEB. 2017
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PROFILES 
CARLOS THOMAS
Head of Monetary Policy Unit
Monetary Policy and Euro Area Division 
DGA Economics and Research 
PEOPLE
RU: Over the years, you have written a number of policy-
relevant papers. At the London School of Economics, your 
thesis supervisor was Kosuke Aoki, a monetary economist, 
but you also studied with Christopher Pissarides, a Nobel 
Prize winner in labor economics. So you have worked in 
both those fields, starting mostly in labor, but gradually 
shifting towards monetary and financial economics. Could 
you start by telling us about your dissertation, on monetary 
policy in an economy with a frictional labor market? 
When I started my PhD, there was a growing 
literature that studied inflation and unemployment 
jointly, by integrating the New Keynesian model of 
monetary policy transmission with the search and 
matching framework of equilibrium unemployment, 
developed in part by Pissarides. But there were few 
studies of optimal policy up to that time; my job 
market paper was one of the first normative studies 
in that literature. In particular, I analyzed the optimal 
monetary policy, under commitment, in a New 
Keynesian model with search and matching in the 
labor market. A first result was that, as long as 
wages are flexible (bargained between workers and 
firms in every period), then the optimal policy is zero 
inflation at all times.
RU: And that is not just a steady-state finding, but also the 
optimal policy after any shock? 
Yes, it is the optimal policy at any point in time. As I 
said, that assumes flexible wage bargaining, but it 
also requires a technical assumption about the 
relative bargaining power of firms and workers (the 
so-called Hosios condition).
That result is an interesting benchmark, implying 
that the same policy which achieves price stability 
also guarantees that unemployment tracks its 
natural value. It extends the finding typical of stand-
ard New Keynesian models (without labor market 
frictions), namely that the same policy which 
stabilizes inflation also stabilizes output optimally – 
which Blanchard and Galí (2007) called the “divine 
coincidence”.
But a more realistic case obviously is one in which 
wages are not perfectly flexible. So I also studied a 
version of the model with both search and matching, 
and sticky wages. I showed that, if nominal wages 
are bargained infrequently, in a staggered fashion 
(following Gertler and Trigari, 2009), then strict 
inflation targeting is no longer optimal. For instance, 
in response to a negative supply shock, the central 
bank should allow inflation to rise temporarily above 
target. This facilitates the adjustment of real wages 
towards their lower natural value, mitigating the 
increase in unemployment. 
RU: So if there are both labor market frictions and nominal 
wage rigidities, this brings back the traditional view, that 
central banks face a tradeoff between unemployment and 
inflation. 
Exactly. This result rationalizes why central banks 
face a tradeoff between stabilizing unemployment 
and stabilizing inflation, for example after a negative 
supply shock.
Now, my dissertation also explored other issues 
related to the integration of the New Keynesian and 
search and matching frameworks. Most previous 
models assumed (for tractability) that some firms 
made hiring decisions, while other different firms 
made pricing decisions. My second paper showed 
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that this assumption is not innocuous. If the firms 
that control hiring also set prices, then the New 
Keynesian Phillips Curve is flatter: any given output 
gap produces lower inflationary pressures. The 
reason is that hiring frictions make labor specific to 
the firm, which means firms’ marginal cost curves 
are upward sloping, in contrast to a frictionless 
labor market where firms can hire as much labor as 
they need at the market wage, so that marginal 
costs are flat. 
RU: At a first impression, it sounds like that might make the 
Phillips curve steeper, not flatter.
Yes, it might sound that way at first, but let me 
explain. Upward-sloping marginal costs mean 
price-setting firms have an incentive to keep their 
prices in line with the overall price level; this is 
known as “strategic complementarity” in prices. For 
example, a firm that considers a price cut will prefer 
not to deviate too much from the prices of other 
firms, because if it has to meet much higher de-
mand its marginal costs will rise. As a result, the 
aggregate price level responds less to aggregate 
shocks. An important corollary is that, by muting 
price responses, this mechanism amplifies 
fluctuations in economic activity and  unemployment. 
Since these models tend to underpredict 
unemployment volatility (Shimer´s “critique” of 
search and matching models), this mechanism 
therefore helps bring the model closer to the data.
Finally, my thesis also included a joint paper with 
Francesco Zanetti, which analyzed how labor market 
reform (in the form of reductions in unemployment 
benefits and firing costs) would affect price stability in 
a New Keynesian model with matching frictions. We 
showed that in this framework, real marginal costs 
can be separated into three components: wage costs, 
hiring costs, and firing costs. So if labor market 
regulation affects hiring and firing costs, it will also 
affect inflation volatility. Nonetheless, quantitatively, 
estimating the model for the euro area, we found that 
hiring and firing costs were only a small component of 
real marginal cost, suggesting that labor market 
reform would do little to change the effectiveness of 
monetary policy, at least in this class of models.
RU: Here at the Banco de España you continued to study 
labor market reforms. Spanish unemployment has been 
extraordinarily variable, compared with other countries, so 
labor market reforms have been a hot topic. What aspects of 
the Spanish labor market have you studied?
To start, I would say that two key problems of the 
Spanish labor market are, first, the duality between 
permanent and temporary contracts (due to the 
large gap in firing costs across contract types), and 
second, the downward rigidity of wages (largely due 
to the inefficiencies of the collective agreement 
regulations). The two main labor market reforms, of 
2010 and 2012, both aimed to make collective 
bargaining more flexible, by facilitating the 
adjustment of each firm’s wages to its particular 
situation, and also to reduce duality by narrowing 
the gap in firing costs between contract types. In 
one paper, written with James Costain and Juan F. 
Jimeno, we showed that, while reducing labor 
market duality may have an ambiguous effect on 
the level of unemployment (lower firing costs 
stimulate hiring, but they also increase firing, as 
many papers have arged), it definitely reduces 
unemployment volatility. 
In a second paper, also with Juan F. Jimeno, we 
showed that, since firms are heterogeneous within 
each sector, organizing collective wage bargaining 
at the sectoral level is not really a good idea. It 
compresses wages within each sector, which 
unambiguously increases unemployment relative to 
a scenario where wages are negotiated at each firm, 
to reflect its cost and demand conditions. 
Interestingly, in our model, rather than dismantling 
sector-level bargaining altogether, it suffices to 
allow each firm and its workers to opt out of the 
sector-level agreement by mutual agreement. We 
call that “efficient opting-out”, since it happens only 
if both workers and firms prefer to leave the sectoral 
bargain. So these analyses suggest that the two 
Spanish labor market reforms where important 
steps in the right direction, namely that of reducing 
the average level of unemployment and also making 
it less sensitive to cyclical fluctuations.
RU: So do you think we need to push further in the direction 
of those two reforms, or would the priorities be different if 
Spanish labor markets were reformed again?
In terms of labor market duality, I think there is more 
room for reduction— the gap in firing costs between 
temporary and permanent contracts is still large. 
But also, notably, there seems to be a consensus 
that active labor market policies in Spain are not 
particularly successful. Overhauling active labor 
market policies, to improve matching and retraining 
and labor mobility, might bring many workers back 
to the labor market. 
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RU: Together with Óscar Arce and Samuel Hurtado, you also 
asked how structural reforms fit together with other 
macroeconomic policies. What did you learn about the 
optimal policy mix now, as Europe recovers?
The idea of our project was to understand the 
interaction between national and supranational 
policies in a monetary union. We considered a two-
country monetary union (call it “core” and 
“periphery”) that finds itself in a liquidity trap. We 
considered a policy package in which the core 
implements a fiscal stimulus, consistent with the 
perception that core countries have space for further 
fiscal expansion; the periphery implements structural 
reforms, consistent with the lack of fiscal space in 
Spain and other peripheral countries; and third, the 
area-wide monetary authority offers forward 
guidance about its policy rate. Interestingly, we 
found sizeable synergies between these policies: 
each policy is more effective when implemented 
together with the other two than it would be in 
isolation. For instance, structural reforms are 
typically deflationary, so they could be contractionary 
when the zero lower bound is binding, by raising real 
interest rates. But if monetary and fiscal stimuli are 
applied at the same time, their inflationary effects 
may undo the short-run deflationary impact of the 
reforms, without offsetting their longer-run 
expansionary effects. This suggests that euro area 
authorities (both national and supranational) should 
support each other on the monetary, fiscal and 
structural reforms fronts, as this will benefit everyone.
RU: Perhaps you should clarify exactly what you mean by 
“forward guidance”.
The forward guidance in our model is a commitment 
by the central bank to keep nominal interest rates at 
zero longer than its policy rule would otherwise 
prescribe, keeping interest rates lower for longer. 
But other expansionary forms of forward guidance 
would also be likely to complement peripheral 
reforms and core fiscal stimulus. 
RU: Your latest research has focused more on money and 
banking. Your paper with Óscar Arce and Javier Andrés finds 
sharper tradeoffs across different monetary policy goals as 
the banking system becomes more competitive, implying 
that the macroeconomy may become more volatile too. 
Could you explain the mechanism?
That paper considers a New Keynesian model with 
financial frictions. In particular, there are 
heterogeneous agents, some of them lending, and 
some borrowing, subject to collateral constraints. 
Interestingly, in this context the central bank should 
not only worry about inflation and output 
stabilization, but should also try to ensure efficient 
consumption risk sharing between borrowers and 
lenders. In a first-best equilibrium, borrowers and 
lenders consume the same amount, since they have 
the same preferences. But in equilibrium in our 
economy, borrowers’ spending is tightly linked to 
the value of their collateral. And since collateral 
values are very volatile in these models, borrowers’ 
consumption becomes excessively volatile. So we 
show that the way to strike a better balance between 
inflation and output stabilization, on one hand, and 
consumption risk sharing on the other, is to cut 
nominal interest rates more aggressively in response 
to a contractionary financial shock (such as a 
decrease in the loan-to-value ratio available in the 
market). That way the central bank avoids an 
excessive fall in asset prices and collateral values 
and, ultimately, in borrowers’ spending capacity 
and consumption. 
Now, as you mentioned, we also showed that greater 
banking competition may actually lead to excessive 
macroeconomic volatility.  I should emphasize that 
in our model, a more competitive banking sector has 
a positive effect on the level of economic activity — 
that is rather obvious. But at the same time there is 
a tradeoff, because it may increase volatility. The 
reason is that more competition and hence lower 
lending rates give borrowers an incentive to increase 
their financial leverage, which naturally leads to 
larger fluctuations in asset prices and spending, 
given the same exogenous shocks.
RU: And is this result is specific to your model, or is it in line 
with previous findings in the literature?
My co-authors’ previous paper already showed that 
stronger banking competition leads to larger 
macroeconomic fluctuations. But in this paper we 
also analyze welfare effects. Stronger banking 
competition not only implies more volatility, but also 
a larger welfare loss from those fluctuations. To 
repeat, this is notwithstanding the beneficial effects 
of stronger banking competition on the level of 
economic activity.
RU: Also, motivated by the crisis, you have studied the 
relation between commercial banking and “shadow” 
banking institutions that face less legislative restrictions. 
You found that the leverage of the shadow banking sector 
grew rapidly during the boom, and then fell quickly during 
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And finally, we showed that the model explains the 
fall in bank leverage, bank assets and GDP in the 
US during the Great Recession fairly well, given the 
measured increase in sector-specific uncertainty in 
those years. We were happy to see that a relatively 
parsimonious model could reproduce those 
fluctuations quantitatively.
RU: What are the monetary policy implications of the model?
Well, the model is entirely real, so currently it says 
nothing about conventional monetary policy. We 
might extend it to a New Keynesian framework with 
nominal rigidities, so that conventional monetary 
policy would have real effects. But even in our real 
model, unconventional monetary policies, such as 
asset purchase programs, could stabilize the 
economy. Gertler and Kiyotaki simulated some 
policies like that in their paper, which also abstracts 
from nominal frictions. We have not tried that yet, 
but it could be interesting.
RU: So, as you have shifted towards research on monetary 
policy and banking, last year you were named Head of the 
Monetary Policy Unit here at the Banco de España. For 
readers unfamiliar with the Eurosystem, what does our 
Monetary Policy Unit do? Obviously, the Banco de España no 
longer has its own monetary policy. What is our role, in the 
context of the Eurosystem?
First, I should stress that while Spain no longer has 
its own monetary policy since 1999, the Banco de 
España has a voice and a vote, through our 
Governor, on the ECB’s Governing Council. That is 
the body that conducts monetary policy in the euro 
area, so we participate directly in the process of 
setting monetary policy.
So our main task is to analyze the macroeconomic 
implications of different monetary policy strategies, 
to underpin the position of the Banco de España 
regarding euro area monetary policy. This includes 
the development of theoretical and empirical 
models to analyze how different monetary policy 
interventions affect the macroeconomy, and the 
different channels through which this impact 
occurs. More generally, we provide the top 
management of the Bank with analysis and advice 
on many issues related to monetary policy 
implementation in the Eurozone. That takes many 
different formats, from research-based analyses to 
policy presentations and discussions with top 
management.
the financial crisis. First of all, isn’t that well known? What 
is really new about your empirical results? 
As far as the empirical findings are concerned, yes, 
we follow research by Adrian and Shin, who found a 
positive comovement between the leverage ratio 
and the total assets of US financial intermediaries. 
As they described it, when US banks expand their 
balance sheets, they borrow more, instead of raising 
new equity. Following their lead, Galo Nuño and I 
studied the comovement of leverage with GDP, 
which is a more conventional way of measuring 
cyclicality. And indeed, we found that US bank 
leverage is also procyclical with respect to GDP. So 
in recessions, bank leverage tends to contract, and 
vice versa in expansions. This cyclicality is more 
pronounced for the shadow sector, but it is also true 
for US charter depository institutions.
RU: So how does your model explain these fluctuations in 
leverage, and what does it imply about their real effects?
We constructed a general equilibrium model with 
financial intermediaries to replicate and explain 
these facts. In our model, banks face an endogenous 
leverage constraint, due to the coexistence of 
limited liability and a moral hazard problem. That is, 
when banks receive funds from their own creditors, 
they may prefer to finance inefficiently risky projects; 
because of limited liability the banks get the upside 
of that risk, while their creditors get the downside. 
Hence, certain types of shocks can reproduce the 
patterns of cyclicality seen in the data. In particular, 
increased uncertainty about the returns on banks’ 
assets forces them to deleverage. The reason is that 
banks’ creditors, who bear the downside risk 
because of banks’ limited liability, will protect 
themselves against increased risk by demanding 
that banks deleverage. Fixing banks’ equity, this 
implies a contraction in their credit supply to the real 
economy, and hence in investment and GDP. This 
way, our model predicts volatile and procyclical bank 
leverage, as in the data. 
Also, I should emphasize that an increase in volatility 
is a real shock, not a shock to the financial system 
per se. It would have no effect whatsoever in a 
conventional “real business cycle” model, since 
(under our assumptions) it only affects the variance 
of returns across banks, not the mean. But with an 
endogenous leverage constraint, this real shock 
feeds through the financial sector to slow down the 
real economy.  
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The Research Clusters are networks open to ESCB 
researchers, that aim to foster awareness of ongoing 
policy-relevant studies and to stimulate collaboration 
across institutions. Current concerns for the 
Monetary Economics cluster (which I will coordinate 
with Alessandro Secchi of the Banca d’Italia) include 
issues such as: transmission, effectiveness and 
side-effects of unconventional monetary measures; 
drivers of actual and expected inflation; the role of 
heterogeneity in the monetary transmission 
mechanism; challenges for monetary policy when 
growth and inflation are low; monetary policy, banks 
and financial markets; interactions across monetary, 
fiscal, structural and macroprudential policies; and 
the monetary framework in the so-called “new 
normal” towards which we are converging in the 
longer term. But the topics we consider will certainly 
evolve. 
Concretely, the cluster’s main activity will be an 
Annual Workshop, which Banco de España will host 
in October this year. But the Cluster may expand 
into further activities in the future. 
 
Research page:
http://www.bde.es/investigador/en/menu/research_staff_a/
Thomas__Carlos.html
RU: Central bankers have emphasized in recent years that 
monetary policy can’t stabilize the macroeconomy alone; 
other policies are essential too. But the Eurosystem is still 
being asked to help Europe exit its long slump. What can 
monetary policy do at this point to meet that goal? Which 
instruments are most relevant now?
Within the context of changes that could be more 
feasible now for the ECB, one issue with current 
strategy is the way the ECB communicates its 
inflation target. Officially, it aims for an inflation rate 
close to, but below, 2%. But what exactly “close to” 
means has never been made precise. So there is 
room for clarifying the ECB’s inflation mandate. One 
possibility would be to announce that the current 
extraordinary measures will remain in place until 
inflation, or forecasted inflation, surpasses 1.9% in 
a sustained manner, without further monetary 
stimulus. But there could be other ways to do this. 
In any case, I think a serious, formal debate of this 
issue would be useful.
RU: Finally, the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), 
which means the ECB plus all the national central banks in 
the European Union, recently set up several networks to 
coordinate research across all the ESCB institutions. You 
have just been appointed as one of the two coordinators of 
the Monetary Policy Research Cluster. What do you see as 
the research agenda for that network?
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NEW FACES
DANILO LEIVA LEÓN
Conjunctural Analysis Division
DG Economics, Statistics and Research
DANILO LEIVA LEÓN joined the Conjunctural Analysis 
Division of the Banco de España in April 2017. After 
obtaining his PhD in Economics from the University of 
Alicante in 2013, he joined the International Economics 
Department of the Bank of Canada. In 2015, Danilo 
started to work for the Central Bank of Chile as a 
Senior Economist at the Research Department. From 
December 2016 until March 2017, he visited the 
Banco de España as a Research Fellow in the 
Modelling and Macroeconomic Analysis Division. 
BING XU
International Financial Markets Division
ADG International Affairs
BING XU jointed the International Financial Markets 
Division of the Banco de España as a staff 
economist in November 2016. Prior to his current 
position, he worked as visiting researcher at the 
Bank of Finland and at the Hong Kong Monetary 
Authority, and as a research assistant at the Banco 
de España. He holds an M.Sc. in Financial 
Economics from Durham University, an M.A. in 
Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, 
and is expecting to obtain his Ph.D. in Economics 
from Carlos III in May 2017. During his Ph.D. 
studies, he worked as teaching and research 
assistant for various courses. 
Bing’s research interests center primarily on applied 
financial economics, banking, and the Chinese 
economy. He has published several research papers 
at the Bank for International Settlements, the Bank of 
Finland, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, and the 
Banco de España, and in journals such as Applied 
Economics. He has also published articles on major 
news and policy portals including VoxEU, Xinhua 
News, and Chinese Financial News, and his work was 
discussed in The Wall Street Journal. His current 
projects investigate i) the impact of legal reforms on 
corporate leverage in China; ii) soft budget constraints 
and monetary policy transmission in China using 
micro-level data; and iii) the “too big to fail” hypothesis, 
using information from primary bond yields of 
European banks. 
His latest project studies how the expansion of the 
scope of permissible collateral can affect firm 
leverage, using the Chinese Property Law reform in 
2007 as an exogenous shock. Difference-in-
differences tests show firms operating with ex ante 
more movable assets expanded their access to bank 
credit, prolonged the maturity of their debt structure, 
and reduced demand for informal credit such as 
account payables. However, the reform did not 
improve the efficiency of credit allocation, as ex ante 
low-quality firms expanded their leverage following 
the reform, while better access to bank credit did not 
lead to better firm performance. This research adds 
to the recent literature on collateral channels and 
capital structure.
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economic topics, including econometric issues, 
such as the estimation of large dimensional factor 
models subject to heterogeneous nonlinearities; 
macro-financial issues, such as the dynamic 
relationship between credit sentiment and the 
business cycle; policy issues, such as the role of 
sectoral comovement in the propagation of monetary 
policy shocks; and international issues, such as the 
drivers and propagation of aggregate volatility 
between developed and developing countries.
Research page:
https://sites.google.com/site/daniloleivaleon/
Danilo is the author of a number of articles published 
in the Journal of Econometrics, the Journal of 
International Economics, the Oxford Bulletin of 
Economics and Statistics, and Macroeconomic 
Dynamics, among other journals. His research 
interests include applied macroeconomics, business 
cycles, forecasting, monetary policy and empirical 
finance. During his fellowship at the Banco de 
España, he worked on analyzing the regional 
economic linkages in Europe and their main drivers, 
focusing on identifying the regions that act as the 
main conduits in the propagation of business cycle 
shocks. Currently, Danilo is working on a range of 
JACOPO TIMINI
International Economics Division
ADG International Affairs
JACOPO TIMINI joined the International Economics 
Division within the ADG International Affairs of the 
Banco de España in December 2016. Prior to joining 
the Banco de España, Jacopo was a consultant 
(economic analyst) at the United Nations World 
Food Programme in Rome; a Marie-Curie Research 
Fellow at University Carlos III Madrid (UC3M); and a 
Research Assistant at the Centre for European 
Policy Studies in Brussels. Jacopo is a Ph.D. 
Candidate at UC3M, and holds an M.A. in European 
Economic Studies (College of Europe, Belgium), 
and B.Sc. and M.Sc. degrees in Economics (Ca’ 
Foscari University of Venice, Italy).
Jacopo’s research focuses in international 
economics (with particular interest on trade and 
market integration), economic growth, and economic 
history. In his latest paper, he studies currency union 
dynamics and trade. Exploiting a recently created 
historical database on international bilateral trade 
flows, his work tests for potential heterogeneous 
effects. In addition, it assesses whether trade effects 
– if any – were related to the credibility that markets 
attached to the underlying economic foundation of 
the union, to the (changing) rules entrenched in the 
monetary agreements, or both.
His current projects include research on the margins 
of trade, institutional isomorphism, and trade 
protectionism.
Research page:
http://portal.uc3m.es/portal/page/portal/dpto_ciencias_
sociales/profesorado/Jacopo%20Timini
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JOSÉ RAMÓN MARTÍNEZ 
RESANO
Country Risk Service 
ADG International Affairs
JOSE RAMON MARTINEZ RESANO joined the Country Risk 
Service of the Banco de España in September 2016. 
He previously served in the Markets and Operations 
Directorate of the Banco de España covering a 
diverse range of topics, including capital markets 
and market infrastructure issues as well as monetary 
policy implementation and central bank finance or 
risk management subjects. His research during that 
period  addressed selected topics in central banking, 
capital markets practice and regulation, and financial 
stability issues. Jose Ramon also has experience as 
a debt manager thanks to his period in the funding 
unit of the Spanish Treasury, and has acted as 
occasional consultant for the World Bank and IMF. 
He has represented the Banco de España in the 
OECD Working Party on debt management, in the 
EU Sovereign Debt Markets Committee of the 
European Commission, in the Paris Club, and in the 
Risk Management Committee of the ECB. His 
research interests in the new phase of his professional 
career revolve around similar subjects albeit from a 
more internationally-oriented perspective.
MIKEL BEDAYO
Prudential Policy Analysis Division
DG Financial Stability and Resolution
MIKEL BEDAYO joined the Financial Stability 
Department of the Banco de España in July 2016. 
He obtained his M.Sc. and Ph.D. in Economics 
from the Université Catholique de Louvain, and he 
also holds an M.A. in Economics and a B.Sc. in 
Business from the Universidad del País Vasco. 
Mikel has also been a visiting scholar in North 
Carolina State University and the European 
University Institute, and has worked at the National 
Bank of Belgium.
Mikel’s research activity focuses on corporate 
finance, firm-bank relations and financial stability. 
His most recent studies shed light on firms’ credit 
access and credit conditions, and which 
characteristics of firms and banks correlate with the 
cyclicality of their credit. In one of his papers he 
analyzes firms’ incentives to join together to apply 
collectively for a single loan. He finds that large and 
long-established firms are more likely to join up with 
other firms to make joint loan applications, and that 
all firms obtain more credit if they demand credit 
from the same bank. Mikel is currently working on a 
project to determine whether innovative and non-
innovative firms suffered equally from the credit 
crunch during the last financial crisis.
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RAQUEL VEGAS SÁNCHEZ
Prudential Policy Analysis Division
DG Financial Stability and Resolution
RAQUEL VEGAS SÁNCHEZ joined the Prudential Policy 
Analysis Division in the Financial Stability Department 
of the Banco de España in May 2016, after 9 months 
working at the Directorate General Economics, 
Statistics and Research. Prior to joining the Banco 
de España, Raquel was an advisor to the Minister of 
Health, Social Services and Equality (2012-2015), a 
research fellow in CEMFI (2011) and a research 
analyst at FEDEA (2008-2011).  She holds a Ph.D. in 
Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid 
(May 2011) with an outstanding thesis award, and an 
undergraduate degree in economics from the same 
university (specialising in macroeconomics, 
monetary economics, and finance).
Raquel is an applied economist. Her research 
interests range from labor and health issues –the 
gender wage gap, immigration, discrimination and 
aging- to macro finance –firms’ bankruptcies and 
business cycles. She has published research papers 
in Annals of Economics and Statistics; the Middle 
East Development Journal and Labour Economics. 
Her current research projects analyze the 
relationship between bank lending and firm 
productivity over the business cycle in Spain, and 
the linkages between judicial efficiency in insolvency 
procedures and firm performance.
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VISITING FELLOWS
FRANCESCO FURLANETTO
Senior Researcher
Norges Bank
FRANCESCO FURLANETTO visited the Banco de 
España from January to mid-March 2017. He holds a 
PhD from the University of Lausanne and has been a 
postdoctoral visiting scholar at CREI in Barcelona, 
before joining Norges Bank where he is currently 
employed as a Senior Researcher. He works on 
theoretical and empirical analysis of the business 
cycle. On the theoretical side, he has worked on New 
Keynesian models with different kinds of frictions and 
studied the role of structural factors in explaining 
unemployment dynamics. On the empirical side, he 
has used VAR models identified with sign restrictions 
to study financial shocks, the importance of labor 
supply factors to explain the decline in the US labor 
force participation rate, and the role of immigration for 
macroeconomic dynamics. His research at the Banco 
de España investigates empirically the response of 
the monetary policy authority to stock prices and 
house prices.
 
Reseach page:  
http://www.norges-bank.no/en/about/Research/economists/
Furlanetto-Francesco/
EMILIANO SANTORO
Associate Professor
University of Copenhagen
Emiliano Santoro is visiting the Macroeconomic 
Analysis Unit of ADG Economics and Research, 
from February to April, 2017. He obtained a PhD in 
Economics from the University of Cambridge in 
2009 and is currently an Associate Professor at the 
University of Copenhagen and a visiting fellow at 
Danmarks Nationalbank. Previously, he has held 
visiting positions at CREI, Barcelona (2010) and 
EIEF, Rome (2013).
Emiliano’s broad interests are in macroeconomics 
and monetary economics. His research has revolved 
around three main topics: i) the role of sectoral 
production linkages for both business cycle and 
monetary policy analysis; ii) the formation of 
heterogeneous inflation expectations; iii) firm 
dynamics and business cycle asymmetries. His 
current research agenda mainly focuses on the role 
of occasionally binding credit constraints for the 
emergence of non-linearities in the business cycle. 
In one of his ongoing projects (with Jensen, Ravn 
and Petrella) he shows that since the mid-1980s, 
despite the Great Moderation, recessions have 
become more severe, reflected in the skewness of 
the business cycle becoming increasingly negative. 
This finding can be explained by the concurrent 
increase in leverage of both households and firms. 
To this end, a dynamic general equilibrium model 
with collateralized borrowing and occasionally 
binding credit constraints is devised. Easier credit 
access increases the likelihood that constraints 
become slack in the face of expansionary shocks, 
while contractionary shocks are further amplified 
due to tighter constraints. As a result, as the fraction 
of binding credit constraints increases, busts 
gradually become deeper than booms.
 
Research page:  
Research Page: http://www.econ.ku.dk/esantoro/
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YUNUS AKSOY
Reader, Dept. of Economics, 
Mathematics and Statistics
Birkbeck, University of London
Yunus Aksoy will be visiting the ADG Economics 
and Research of the Banco de España during the 
period from April to July, 2017. 
He is a Reader in Economics at Birkbeck, University 
of London. He is currently the Director of the 
Birkbeck Centre for Applied Macroeconomics 
(BCAM), and he is a CESIfo Research Network 
Fellow. He holds a B.A.  from Boğaziçi Üniversitesi 
and a Ph.D. from Katholieke Universiteit Leuven. His 
research has appeared in leading journals of 
macroeconomics, among them the Journal 
of Monetary Economics, the Economic Journal and 
the European Economic Review. His current 
work on monetary and macroeconomics is 
concerned with i) the interactions between financial 
markets and macroeconomic outcomes at the 
business cycle frequency and ii) the impact of 
demographic structures on the macroeconomy in 
the medium run. 
During his Banco de España visit he will be working 
on two projects. The first studies the impact of 
changing age profiles on consumption behaviour by 
using household level data. The second is related to 
the effects of aging populations on global liquidity 
conditions. 
Research page:  
http://www.bbk.ac.uk/ems/faculty/aksoy
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ESSIM is an annual meeting that brings together about 
75 economists from across Europe and key researchers 
from outside the region to focus on international 
economics and other areas of macroeconomics. It 
provides a unique opportunity for macroeconomists from 
different institutions and countries to discuss research, 
and for young researchers to meet and discuss their 
work with senior economists, combining workshop 
sessions with time for collaboration and consultation.
Sessions on Tuesday and Wednesday, May 23-24, will 
focus on the CEPR programme area of Monetary 
Economics and Fluctuations. Thursday and Friday, May 
25-26, will feature parallel sessions on the areas of 
International Money and Finance, and Macroeconomics 
and Growth. Plenary sessions relevant to all three 
programme areas will take place late on Wednesday 
and early on Thursday.
The conference organizers are Philippe Bacchetta 
(University of Lausanne and CEPR), Francesco Caselli 
(LSE and CEPR), Wouter den Haan (LSE and CEPR), 
and James Costain (Banco de España).
link to CEPR events page
FIRST CONFERENCE ON FINANCIAL STABILITY
MADRID, 24-25 MAY 2017
The Banco de España, together with the Centro de 
Estudios Monetarios y Financieros (CEMFI) is starting a 
series of biennial conferences to promote the research 
and discussion of topics related to financial stability 
among academics, practitioners, and policy-makers. 
The first conference will be held at the Banco de 
España’s headquarters in Madrid on 24-25 May 2017. 
Mario Draghi, President of the European Central Bank, 
will be the keynote speaker, and Luis M. Linde, Governor 
of the Banco de España, will open the conference.
link to conference webpage
UPCOMING CONFERENCES
LINK TO CONFERENCES PAGE
HOW MUCH OF A FISCAL UNION FOR THE EMU?
MADRID, MAY 18-19, 2017
A central question in the development of Europe is how 
much of a Fiscal Union is needed to have a stable and 
resilient Euro Area and EU. This has been a recurrent 
question through the euro crisis, where the ECB has 
played a major role, like that played by the Fed during 
the financial crisis, although the latter could count on 
the backing of the US Treasury. Brexit and the current 
developments in the global economy (migration crisis, 
US elections, etc.) have exacerbated the need to 
address this question and find viable solutions for the 
EMU institutional framework. 
On Thursday and Friday, May 18-19, 2017, the Banco 
de España will host a conference organized by the 
Horizon 2020 Project ADEMU - “A Dynamic Economic 
and Monetary Union”, focusing on this question. The 
aim of the conference is to present and discuss current 
research on the topic and debate policy experiences 
and proposals. The conference will also discuss how 
the recent political events and current trends may affect 
the EMU fiscal and monetary framework. 
More detailed information regarding the conference 
and related activities is available at the ADEMU website: 
http://ademu-project.eu/.
25TH CEPR EUROPEAN SUMMER SYMPOSIUM  
IN INTERNATIONAL MACROECONOMICS (ESSIM)
RODA DE BARÁ, TARRAGONA, 23-26 MAY 2017
The 25th CEPR European Summer Symposium in 
International Macroeconomics (ESSIM) will take place 
from Tuesday to Friday, May 23-26, 2017, at the Banco 
de España facilities in Tarragona, Spain. 
ANNOUNCEMENTS
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8TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE SPANISH ASSOCIATION  
OF LAW AND ECONOMICS
MADRID, JUNE 29-30, 2017
On June 29-30, the Universidad Carlos III de Madrid will 
host in its new downtown Madrid campus the 8th Annual 
Conference of the Spanish Association of Law and 
Economics. It will be coorganized by María Gutiérrez 
Urtiaga (Univ. Carlos III), Josep Tribó Giné (Univ. Carlos 
III), Juan S. Mora-Sanguinetti (Banco de España) and 
Maribel Sáez Lacave (Univ. Autónoma de Madrid). The 
conference will cover all topics related to Law and 
Economics (including, but not limited to structural 
policies, taxation, antitrust, regulation or corporate 
governance).
This year, the keynote speaker will be Colin Mayer (Saïd 
Business School, Oxford University). The conference will 
also host a special session on “New Ways of Financing 
Innovation” in collaboration with the Business Department 
of Univ. Carlos III, and a special session organized with 
the Fundación para la Investigación sobre el Derecho y la 
Empresa (FIDE).
Further information is available at http://www.car3fin.es/
aedeconference/ (or by contacting the organization: 
aede2017@uc3m.es).
FIRST BANCO DE ESPAÑA ANNUAL RESEARCH CONFERENCE
MADRID, AUGUST 31 – SEPTEMBER 1, 2017
On August 31 and September 1, 2017, the Banco de 
España will host its First Annual Research Conference in 
its Madrid headquarters. 
In much of the industrialized world, including the euro 
area, the macroeconomic landscape is characterized by 
sluggish growth, inflation persistently below target, low 
interest rates (including short-term nominal rates close to 
their effective lower bounds), and increasing risks to 
financial stability. Against this background, economic 
policy-makers, including fiscal, monetary and 
macroprudential authorities, face the formidable 
challenge of promoting a faster economic recovery and 
the return of inflation to its target level, while ensuring 
financial stability. The aim of the conference is to bring 
together world leading scholars and policy-makers in 
order to discuss the causes of these macroeconomic 
developments and the policy measures to address them. 
Tobias Adrian, Ricardo Caballero, Gauti Eggertsson, 
Emmanuel Farhi, Jesús Fernández-Villaverde, Jordi Galí, 
Nobuhiro Kiyotaki, Morten Ravn, Tano Santos and Frank 
Smets have already confirmed their participation.
NEW FACES IN MACRO: MADRID WORKSHOP IN QUANTITATIVE 
MACROECONOMICS
MADRID, 29-30 MAY, 2017
In May, the Banco de España and the Universidad 
Carlos III de Madrid are jointly organizing a meeting 
entitled “New Faces in Macro: Madrid Workshop in 
Quantitative Macroeconomics”. The goal of this 
workshop is to provide a forum for junior economists 
based in Europe with a special interest in quantitative 
macroeconomics, and to establish an academic 
network among this group. The organizers are Juan 
Francisco Jimeno, Yuliya Kulikova, and Omar Rachedi 
of the Banco de España; Nezih Guner and Josep Pijoan 
of CEMFI; and Andrés Erosa, Felix Wellschmied, and 
Emircan Yurdagul (Carlos III).
The workshop will last two days. The first day will be 
hosted by the Banco de España, whereas the second 
day will be hosted on the Getafe campus of Univ. 
Carlos III. Each day will feature 7 presenters and 7 
discussants. 
Although the workshop will cover a variety of topics, 
ranging from fiscal policy up to human capital 
accumulation, most of the papers will emphasize the 
macroeconomic implications of heterogeneity across 
households.
5TH WORLD BANK - BANCO DE ESPAÑA RESEARCH 
CONFERENCE
MADRID, 12 JUNE 2017
The Banco de España and the World Bank are organizing 
their fifth joint research conference, which will take place 
in Madrid on June 12, 2017. The conference, entitled 
“The Future of Globalization and Economic Integration in 
Europe and Latin America: Implications for Growth and 
Social Equality”, aims to foster dialogue between 
academics and policy makers working on globalization, 
economic integration, and development. It will focus on 
the challenges and opportunities associated with 
globalization. Drawing on state-of-the-art economic 
research, participants will discuss new evidence on the 
consequences of globalization for growth and 
development, as well as employment levels, wages, and 
inequality. The conference will also address possible 
policy responses. The focus of the conference will be 
global, but special consideration will be given to emerging 
markets broadly and to Latin America in particular.
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THIRTEENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON REAL-TIME DATA 
ANALYSIS, METHODS, AND APPLICATIONS IN MACROECONOMICS 
AND FINANCE
MADRID, OCTOBER 19-20, 2017
On October 19-20, 2017, the Banco de España will 
organize the 13th Annual Conference on Real-Time 
Data Analysis, Methods, and Applications in 
Macroeconomics and Finance. 
The conference will bring together leading researchers 
in real-time analysis of economic data. It will cover 
topics such as real-time macroeconometrics and 
financial econometrics and forecasting. Likewise, it will 
cover macroeconomic policy analysis, where real-time 
data analysis has become an essential part of the 
toolkit for policy evaluation.
This annual conference has usually been organized by 
the Philadelphia Fed and HEC Montreal in previous 
years. For the first time, the conference is being held 
outside of North America, and the Banco de España 
was selected to organize the event.
Interested researchers are invited to respond to the 
Call for Papers by June 30, 2017.
FIRST ANNUAL WORKSHOP: ESCB RESEARCH CLUSTER 2 
“MEDIUM- AND LONG-RUN CHALLENGES FOR EUROPE” 
EUROPEAN SYSTEM OF CENTRAL BANKS
MADRID, 16 – 17 NOVEMBER, 2017
Europe has been tested by multiple shocks and 
stresses in recent years; sluggish growth, current 
account imbalances and other asymmetries remain 
challenging for monetary and macroeconomic policy 
makers. Hence, major improvements of governance 
structures still appear essential for the long-run stability 
of EMU. Even in the best case, difficult long-run trends 
loom, including supporting aging populations, and 
adapting workforces to new technologies that may 
amplify inequality. 
With these challenges in mind, submissions are invited 
from ECSB economists for the First Annual Workshop 
of ESCB Research Cluster 2, a network devoted to 
research on topics of international macroeconomics, 
fiscal policy, labor economics, competitiveness, and 
EMU governance. The Workshop, entitled “Medium- 
and long-run challenges for Europe”, will take place at 
the Banco de España, in Madrid, on Thursday and 
Friday, November 16-17, 2017. 
More generally, our Annual Research Conference is 
aimed at becoming the Banco de España’s flagship 
research conference, and at reaffirming the Banco de 
España’s commitment to research as an indispensable 
tool for improving economic policy-making.
CALLS FOR PAPERS
THIRD SEMINAR IN ECONOMIC HISTORY
MADRID, OCTOBER 5, 2017
On October 5, 2017, the Banco de España will host its 
Third Seminar in Economic History. As on previous 
occasions, presentations will include the results of 
research projects on Economic History financed by the 
Banco de España, together with other submitted papers 
on Spanish and international economic history. Scholars 
are invited to submit their proposals before May 30th.
Call for Papers
FIRST ANNUAL WORKSHOP: ESCB RESEARCH CLUSTER 1 
“MONETARY ECONOMICS” 
EUROPEAN SYSTEM OF CENTRAL BANKS
MADRID, 9-10 OCTOBER 2017
On October 9 and 10, the Banco de España will host 
the First Annual Workshop of the ESCB Research 
Cluster on “Monetary Economics”, a network of ESCB 
researchers aimed at fostering awareness on monetary 
policy-relevant studies and stimulating collaborations 
across ESCB institutions in the area of monetary 
economics and monetary policy. 
ESCB economists are invited to submit either 
theoretical or empirical contributions. Workshop topics 
include the transmission, effectiveness and side-effects 
of unconventional monetary measures; drivers of actual 
and expected inflation; the role of agent heterogeneity 
in the monetary transmission mechanism; challenges 
for monetary policy in a low-growth, low-inflation 
environment; monetary policy, banks and financial 
markets; interactions among monetary, fiscal, structural 
and macroprudential policies; monetary policy strategy 
and the operational framework in the “new normal”. 
Keynote lectures at the conference will be delivered by 
Prof. Jordi Galí (CREI, UPF and Barcelona GSE) and 
Prof. Ricardo Reis (LSE). ESCB researchers are invited 
to submit a paper in PDF format to cluster1escb@bde.es 
by 15 June.
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Keynote lectures at the conference will be delivered by 
Prof. Pol Antràs (Harvard University) and Prof. Giancarlo 
Corsetti (University of Cambridge). Conference 
organizers include representatives of six ESCB 
institutions. ESCB economists wishing to submit a 
paper, to participate as discussants, or simply to 
attend, should contact cluster2escb@bde.es. The 
deadline for paper submissions is June 15, 2017.
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